Friday, March 02, 2012

Is the Libya Model Applicable to Syria?

After the veto of the Arab League’s Syria Plan in the United Nations Security Council, the International Conference of “Friends of Syria” showed that there are differences in opinion among the actors on the method to follow in Syria. Whereas Saudi Arabia and Qatar advocates the arming of the Syrian opposition, the majority takes a dim view towards that on the grounds that it will worsen the clashes. The actors, who support the change, “do not want to hand over arms, before grasping the essence of the Syrian opposition clearly”, in the words of the US Chief of Staff.

Most of the people, who take part in the uprising in Syria, are common people. The dissidents consist of the people, who try to defend themselves and who are at the bottom of the society. These groups are getting more organized day by day but they aren’t sufficiently organized yet. Furthermore there is an asymmetric power balance between the armed opposition and the Syria army. Because of this, the change in Syria is not possible unless there is an international support.

Different approaches by different countries make it harder to move in a coordinated way. The meeting in Tunisia clearly put forward the situation. It is expected that, the Friends of Syria Group will be better coordinated in the meetings in France and Turkey, just like the Syrian opposition managed to organize well. In the current situation, there is a consensus about increasing political and diplomatic sanctions and supporting the opposition. However, everyone knows that the solution must include an armed dimension. While the arming of the opposition and the option of international intervention were not accepted in Tunisia meeting, there was a consensus about establishing a “humanitarian assistance corridor.”

At this stage, only some people within the Syrian opposition utter the option of international intervention. It concerns everyone about that an international intervention, which has a low chance of success, may cause a new Iraq or Afghanistan in the region. Besides, there is a possibility that the war might spill over to the region and attain an international dimension. It is also known that the intervention might negatively affect the domestic stability in Syria. There might be some consequences such as long-term guerrilla resistance and safe havens for terrorist groups. The pro-opposition statements by Ayman Al-Zawahiri, the leader of al-Qaeda, are considered important in this context.

Thereby, the resolution of the Syria crisis is a big mystery. The offered options could not be implemented because of the difficulty in applying, the inability to foresee the outcomes, the possibility to bring about a worse situation, and the low chance of success. The most debated option is an armed intervention. It is claimed that while a comprehensive international intervention is very difficult, the same kind of intervention that is seen in Libya could be implemented in Syria. However, the conditions, which made an international intervention possible in Libya, do not exist in Syria; therefore an international intervention is not likely to happen yet.

The conditions, which made the international intervention possible in Libya, were the rifts within the Gaddafi regime, the defections by ranked military officers and politicians from Gaddafi’s side to the opposition’s side, the existence of a homogeneous political and armed opposition, who can struggle with the central authority and relatively organized, the international legitimacy of the opposition and the most important of all the capture of Benghazi as a safe haven.

However, in the case of Syria, we can observe that none of these factors exists completely. The defections from Syrian regime are very low rate in terms of quality and quantity. Apart from some diplomats and some deputies from politicians and bureaucrats, there is no substantial defection. It can be seen that Assad Regime stills retains control on the state officials. Defections within the security forces are comparatively more but it is not enough to tip the balance between the Syrian army and the opposition in the favor of the opposition. Brigadier General Ahmad Al-Seyh, who took shelter in Turkey at the beginning of 2012, is the most high-ranking defection up to now. Except him the number of officers, who defected from the Syrian army and established the Free Syrian Army (FSA), is fifteen thousand, according to officers of FSA. The leader of the FSA is an officer with the rank of colonel. Considering the political opposition, it is observed that it doesn’t have the capacity to directly manage and influence the popular uprising. There is also a problem about the homogeneity of political and military opposition in Syria. While the FSA pioneers the armed opposition, the leadership stationed in Turkey lacks the capacity to influence the domestic structure and the domestic elements lacks coordination among themselves. Besides, military organizations other than the FSA, such as the Military Council, start to emerge. The political opposition suffers from the problem of homogeneity as well. Although there is the Syrian National Council, who becomes prominent, there are some other alternatives in Syria, which is active and has different approaches, such as the National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change.

Lastly, there is the lack of a capture and maintenance of a safe haven by the opposition. In spite of the fact that FSA has taken the control in suburbs of Homs, Hama, Idlib even Damascus, it is not permanent and cannot spread to the whole city.

Another method of international intervention is to create a safe haven through foreign support, which the opposition failed. The creation of a safe haven will prevent more Syrian civilian deaths and will enable the fractured opposition to be better organized. The opposition will carry out a more effective struggle against the regime from this safe haven. Foremost, this will speed up defections by security forces, who wants to defect but cannot do because of the fear of death. The most critical risk of this kind of intervention is that the Syrian regime will perceive this as a vital threat and will attack, thus will widen the violence and the range of instability. In turn this will necessitate a larger armed intervention, which no one thinks about it at this stage. Furthermore, the place, where the safe haven will be established, is another question. Because of the fact that the settlements in Syria has a complex structure, it is not possible to find a homogeneous population, who opposes the regime. And this may cause conflicts within the secured zone. Hence, this will damage both the legitimacy and success of the intervention.

Thursday, March 01, 2012

Suriye için Libya Modeli Uygulanabilir mi?

Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi’nde, Arap Ligi Suriye planının veto edilmesinin ardından oluşturulan “Suriye’nin Dostları” grubu toplantısı, Suriye’de değişimi savunan aktörler arasında izlenecek yönteme ilişkin bazı görüş farklılıkları olduğunu ortaya koydu. Suudi Arabistan ve Katar Suriyeli muhaliflerin silahlandırılmasını savunurken, çoğunluk bu öneriye Suriye’de çatışmayı körükleyeceği gerekçesiyle soğuk yaklaşmaktadır. Henüz o aşamaya gelinmediğini düşünen ülkeler koşulların daha olgunlaşmasını beklemektedir. Değişimi savunan aktörler ABD Genelkurmay Başkanı’nın ifadesiyle “Suriyeli muhalefetin özünü daha net şekilde anlamadan silah teslim etmek istememektedir.”

Suriye’de ayaklanan insanların büyük çoğunluğu sıradan insanlardır. Kendilerini savunmaya çalışan, toplumun alt katmanlarında yer alan kişilerden oluşmaktadır. Bu gruplar her geçen gün daha organize olmakla birlikte henüz yeterince örgütlü olamadıkları görülmektedir. Ayrıca silahlı muhalifler ile Suriye ordusu arasında asimetrik bir güç dengesi bulunmaktadır. Bu gerçek uluslararası destek olmadan Suriye’de değişimin mümkün olmadığı sonucunu doğurmaktadır.

Ülkelerin farklı yaklaşımlara sahip olması koordineli hareket edilmesini zorlaştırmaktadır. Tunus toplantısı bunu net olarak ortaya koymuştur. Türkiye ve Fransa’da düzenlenecek konferanslarda aynen Suriye muhalefetinin daha organize olmaya başlaması gibi “Suriye’nin Dostları” grubunun da daha koordineli hareket tarzı geliştirmesi beklenebilir. Gelinen aşamada siyasi, diplomatik yaptırımların ağırlaştırılması, Suriye muhalefetine siyasal destek verilmesi konusunda bir uzlaşı söz konusudur. Ancak sorunun çözümünün askeri boyutu da içermesi gerektiği herkes tarafından bilinmektedir. Tunus toplantısında uluslararası müdahale ya da muhalefetin silahlandırılması gibi seçenekler şimdilik kabul görmese de süreci buna doğru götürebilecek “insani yardım koridoru oluşturulması” konusunda fikir birliği sağlanmıştır.

Şu aşamada uluslararası müdahale sadece bazı Suriyeli muhalifler tarafından dile getirilmektedir. Olası bir müdahalenin başarı şansının düşüklüğü ve sonucun bölgede yeni bir Irak veya Afganistan yaratacağı düşüncesi herkesi kaygılandırmaktadır. Ayrıca olası bir savaşın bölgeselleşeceği hatta uluslararası boyut kazanması olasılığı mevcuttur. Müdahalenin Suriye içi istikrarı olumsuz etkilemesi söz konusu olabilir. Uzun süreli gerilla tarzı direniş hareketleri, terör örgütlerinin alan bulması gibi sonuçlar doğabilir. El Kaide lideri Ayman El Zevahiri’nin Suriye’deki direniş hareketine destek veren açıklamaları bu çerçevede değerlendirilebilir.

Dolayısıyla Suriye sorununun nasıl çözüleceği konusu büyük bir soru işareti konumundadır. Önerilen seçenekler; uygulanmasının zorluğu, sonuçlarının kestirilemiyor olması, mevcut durumdan daha kötüsünü üretebileceği, sonuç alma şansının düşük olması gibi nedenlerle hayata geçirilememektedir. En çok tartışılan öneri ise askeri önlemler alınmasıdır. Kapsamlı bir uluslararası müdahale çok zor gözükse de Libya benzeri bir müdahale tarzının Suriye’ye uygulanabileceği öne sürülmektedir. Ancak bu seçenek de hali hazırda Libya’ya uluslararası müdahaleyi mümkün kılan koşulların Suriye’de oluşmamış olması nedeniyle mümkün gözükmemektedir.

Libya’da müdahaleyi mümkün kılan Kaddafi rejimi içinde ciddi ayrışımların yaşanması, önemli siyasi ve askeri figürlerin muhalif kampa geçmesi, merkezi otoriteye karşı mücadele yürütebilecek nispeten organize homojen bir siyasi ve silahlı muhalif yapının varlığı, bu yapının uluslararası meşruiyet kazanması ve hepsinden önemlisi bir bölgenin kontrolünün tamamen muhaliflerin eline geçmesi yani Bingazi gibi bir güvenli bölgenin oluşmasıydı.

Suriye örneğine bakıldığında ise bu etkenler açısından hiçbirinin tam anlamıyla gerçekleşmediği görülmektedir. Suriye yönetimi içinden yaşanan kopuşlar şimdiye kadar nitelik ve nicelik açısından düşük seviyede kalmıştır. Siyasetçi ve bürokratlar arasından bazı milletvekilleri ve diplomatlar dışında önemli bir kopuş gerçekleşmemiştir. Esad rejiminin devlet yetkilileri üzerinde halen kontrole sahip olduğu görülmektedir. Güvenlik birimleri içinden kopuşlar nispeten daha fazla olmakla birlikte bu da Suriye ordusu ile silahlı muhalefet arasındaki dengeyi muhalifler lehine bozacak çapta değildir. Şimdiye kadar Suriye ordusundan en üst rütbeli kopuş 2012 yılının başında Türkiye’ye sığınan Tuğgeneral Mustafa Ahmed El-Şeyh olmuştur. Onun dışında Suriye ordusundan kopan subayların oluşturduğu “Özgür Suriye Ordusu”na (ÖSO) mensup subayların sayısının 15 bin civarında olduğu örgütün yetkilileri tarafından dile getirilmektedir. ÖSO’nun liderliğini ise albay rütbesindeki bir subay yürütmektedir. Siyasi muhalefete baktığımızda da halk ayaklanmasını yönlendirebilecek, protestocular üzerinde doğrudan etki ve yönlendirme kapasitesine sahip bir muhalefetin oluşamadığı görülmektedir. Homojen bir siyasal ve askeri muhalefet açısından baktığımızda da sorunlu bir durum karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Askeri muhalefet olarak ÖSO ön plana çıksa da, Türkiye’deki liderliğin içerdeki yapı üzerindeki etkinliği ve içerdeki birimlerin kendi aralarındaki koordinasyonu konularında eksiklikler olduğu görülmektedir. Ayrıca Askeri Konsey gibi, ÖSO’dan farklı bazı askeri yapılanmaların da ortaya çıkmaya başladığı görülmektedir. Siyasal muhalefet açısından da homojenlik sorunu mevcuttur. Her ne kadar Suriye Ulusal Konseyi öne çıksa da Suriye içinde faaliyet gösteren ve farklı yaklaşımlara sahip “Demokratik Değişim için Ulusal Koordinasyon Komitesi” gibi alternatif yapılar da mevcuttur.

Son olarak belli bir bölgenin muhaliflerin kontrolüne geçmesi ve güvenli bölge oluşturma açısından da eksiklik söz konusudur. Her ne kadar ÖSO; Humus, Hama, Idlib ve hatta Şam’ın kenar mahallelerinde kontrolü ele geçirse de bu kalıcı olamamakta ve şehirlerin tamamına yayılamamaktadır.

Bir diğer uluslararası müdahale tarzı ise muhaliflerin kurmayı başaramadığı güvenli bölgenin dış destek yardımı ile kurulmasıdır. Güvenli bölgenin kuruluşu hem daha fazla Suriyeli sivilin ölümünü engelleyecek hem de parçalı muhalefetin daha organize hale gelmesini sağlayacaktır. Bu bölge üzerinden rejime karşı daha etkili mücadele yürütülecektir. En önemlisi de güvenlik birimlerinden ayrılmak isteyen ancak yaşam korkusu nedeniyle ne yapacağını bilemeyen askerlere güvenli bir seçenek sunularak ordudan kopuş süreci hızlandırılacaktır. Bu seçeneğin en önemli risklerinden biri Suriye yönetiminin böylesi bir yapılanmayı yaşamsal tehdit olarak değerlendirip saldırı gerçekleştirmesidir ki bu da istikrarsızlığın şiddeti ve alanını genişletecektir. Bu da hiçbir aktörün şu aşamada düşünmediği geniş çaplı askeri müdahaleleri zorunlu kılabilir. Ayrıca güvenli bölgenin nerede kurulacağı da önemli bir soru işaretidir. Suriye’de yerleşim birimlerinin genellikle karışık bir yapıya sahip olması nedeniyle ülkenin belli bir bölgesinde homojen bir şekilde rejim karşıtı bir nüfus yapısı bulunmamaktadır. Bu da oluşturulacak güvenli bölge içi çatışmaların çıkmasına neden olabilir. Bu da müdahalenin hem başarısı hem de meşruiyetini olumsuz etkileyecektir.

Wednesday, February 29, 2012

New Road Map for Syria: Results of Tunis Meeting and Constitution Referendum

Upon the fact that Arab League's Syria plan was vetoed in United Nations (UN) Security Council, the actors in favor of transformation in Syria started to seek ways for non-UN solutions. After the veto, a group called “Friends of Syria” was created and it was aimed to enable political change in Syria through alternative international mechanisms by overcoming the objections of Russia and China. Within this framework, the first meeting of “Friends of Syria” group took place on February 24th 2012, in Tunisia. The representatives of more than 70 countries participated in the meeting, and not surprisingly, Russia and China did not send any representatives to the Tunis meeting. At the end of the meeting, the next meeting was decided to be held in Turkey and the third one in France. Besides, Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan was appointed as the joint UN-Arab League crisis envoy to Syria.

The decisions taken during the Tunis meeting shed light on future developments of the Syrian crisis that is at top of world agenda, and on what kind of steps to be taken against the Assad regime by international community. A final declaration was issued at the end of the meeting. Featured topics are as follows:

- The emphasis was laid on the importance attached to Syria's territorial integrity, sovereignty, national unity and independence.

- The Syrian regime’s ongoing, widespread, and systematic human rights violations, use of force and sexual violence against civilians, persecution of detainees were strongly condemned.

- The Arab League's proposal to achieve a peaceful resolution of the crisis was welcomed, and demands for the cease of current violence, the release of detainees, the withdrawal of tanks and armed forces from cities and towns, as well as demands for allowing peaceful demonstrations were reiterated.

- A call for the formation of a national-unity government including all segments of society in Syria was issued. The group set out its full support for the establishment of a national-unity government and a dialogue between the sides for a democratic, pluralist, equal, political transition process within the framework of the Arab League plan; and also supported the demands for holding transparent and free elections under Arab and international supervision.

- The Friends of Syria Group also emphasized that they would continue to apply and enforce political, economic, diplomatic sanctions on the Syrian regime in order to stop the violence.

Despite the fact that sanctions came to the forefront at the end of the meeting, certain proposals that could pave the way for military measures were also brought up to the agenda. In the final declaration, the humanitarian situation in Syria was touched and the Friends’ Group called on the Syrian government to allow access of humanitarian aid in Homs and other areas by UN and other humanitarian agencies. Humanitarian aid could be sent only if UN issued a relevant decision and Syria authorized it. In case the Syrian government does not agree with the decision, the aid will be delivered unilaterally. And this situation brings up the establishment of humanitarian corridor requiring military defense. In his statement after the meeting, Foreign Minister Davutoğlu gave the signs of possible military precautions by saying that “if the humanitarian tragedy continues, then other alternatives will have to be considered.” The Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal put forward his country's decision on taking more strict measures as he described “arming the Syrian rebels fighting against the al-Assad regime as being an excellent idea.” Another leader who brought up military measures to the agenda was the Tunisian President, Moncef Marzuki. Marzuki proposed the “creation of an Arab force in Syria to accompany diplomatic efforts”.

The Syrian National Council As “A” Legitimate Representative of The Syrian People

One of the most important results of the Tunis meeting was the “recognition of the Syrian National Council (SNC) as a legitimate representative of the Syrian people seeking for a democratic and peaceful change” as the Friends of Syria group. Thus, SNC gained an international legitimacy. In the recognition, the expression “a representative” was preferred instead of “only representative”. During the process in Libya, the opponents were firstly recognized as “a representative” and then as the “only legitimate representative”. The Tunisian Foreign Minister believes that SNC will be recognized as the “only legitimate representative” in the following stage.

The recognition of the Syrian National Council (SNC), which is the largest-scale opposition organization, as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people points out an extremely important stage in Syrian crisis. Because hereinafter, the majority of the international community will address themselves to SNC and thus the Assad regime with already deepening isolation will be further isolated.

On the other hand, recognition of SNC as the legitimate representative indicates that this organization will be an efficient political actor in case of a possible regime change in Syria. Therefore, questions on what kind of solution SNC offered for Syria crisis, and what kind of political program SNC has, shed light on toppling process of the Assad regime and on how the post-Assad Syrian political life will be shaped. With the declaration issued after the meeting, SNC shared its political approach towards critical issues and its opinions on the future development of political process. Accordingly;

SNC put forward that it seeks for a two-pillar solution. The first pillar is “emergency humanitarian assistance”, and the second pillar is “following a political process for a peaceful transition”. The humanitarian assistance pillar of this strategy mainly embodies military measures. Because within the scope of reaching humanitarian assistances to the Syrian people, it is proposed to establish “safe humanitarian corridors” or “safe zones”. It is seen that with the establishment of safe zones, on one hand they strive to maintain security of civilians and on the other hand they seek for an area where the opponents could become organized more easily.

And in the aspect of supporting the political process, it is proposed to “create local councils in different regions of the country in order to help civilians and to coordinate assistances”. Thus, SNC wants to start preparations for an alternative state-structuring. In this way, they strive to prevent a post-Assad chaos and conflict. Within the frame of the objective to secure the post-Assad order, it was proposed that the countries do not limit their military assistance for Syrian opposition. Within the same framework, they put forward their expectations for assistance on keeping entries and exits on Syrian borders under control. Here, the main expectation is to prevent radical Islamist groups, which would want to take advantage of the post-Assad chaos across the country, from entering in the country.

The SNC indicated that it is ready for a peaceful transition by stating that “a political negotiation with the acceptable members of the Syrian government is possible.” However, it was understood that there is a distinction made between “unacceptable members” and “acceptable members”. Thus, as a precondition for negotiations, it was suggested to remove the Assad family and his immediate family away from the power. The SNC divides the ones to be punished for crimes they committed into two groups. People in the first group will never be tolerated. It is stated that some other officials will be removed from their offices but they will be allowed to carry on living in the country. Considering that the Assad administration will not accept these conditions under the present conditions, it is seen that the possibility of a peaceful transition is almost zero.

The opposition states that the primary agenda is to form a unity government. And the primary task of a unity government will be to restructure the security apparatus of the country, to revise the constitution, and to restructure government institutions so they continue to serve the people and keep the order during the transition. It was emphasized that the national unity transition government will include members from the regime who have no responsibility in crimes or major corruption affairs, opposition figures and representatives of the revolutionary committees. This government will carry the country to the elections for the designation of a “Constituent Assembly”. And the Constituent Assembly will carry the country to parliamentary and presidential elections to be held within 1-1,5 years.

The SNC stated that necessary guarantees will be given to all ethnic (Kurds, Assyrians and others) and religious (Christians, Alawites, Druze and others) minorities composing the Syrian society, and tried to win all the social groups over. It was stated that their safety and all the constitutional rights would be guaranteed. The SNC also guaranteed that all citizens would be provided with equal rights within its political program. Indicating that the regime took the Alawite community in the country hostage, the SNC guaranteed that the security forces would maintain necessary safety for the security of this society in the aftermath of the fall of the regime. Meanwhile Burhan Ghalioun, President of the Syrian National Council (SNC), who participated in the conference stated that a regime far from centralism will be established in the country, in case the Assad regime falls. In addition to this statement, considering the social realities of the country as well, it is seen that new Syria will have a decentralized structure. With this statement, Ghalioun strived to win the Syrian Kurds and Arab Alawites, who have not attempted to stage a severe revolt against the Assad regime, over to the opposition side. Social groups in the form of new administration that are not extreme centralist will have a certain self-determination in their own regions.

Counter-Attack From Assad: New Constitution Referendum

While “Friends of Syria” group takes decisions to impose sanctions, on the other hand, anti-regime demonstrations continue in Syria. Almost a hundred civilians are killed as a result of bombardments and fire with each passing day. In such an environment where the pressure on the Syrian regime is gradually increasing, a counter-attack came from the Head of State Assad. Syria went to polls for a new Constitution at the weekend. In response to administration's calling the people to vote, the opposition called on Syrians to boycott the referendum. The new Constitution was prepared by a committee appointed by the Syrian President Bashar Assad. The biggest novelty to be brought by the new Constitution is adopting a multi-party system by removing the autarchy of the Ba'ath party. Besides, President's term of office is limited to a maximum of two terms of seven years each. If the draft constitution is approved, the Syrian government will hold parliamentary elections on a multi-party basis within 90 days of the vote. This step also shows the fact that the Syrian administration started to understand the impossibility of maintenance of the status quo as it is. However, achievement of such attempts, which could have yielded result in the beginning of the events, is not possible in terms of suppressing the riot from now on. As a matter of fact, the first statements from the opposition wing are in the same direction. The opposition think that only the groups that are close to the power will be allowed to establish a party, even if door to a multi-party system is opened. Besides, other amendment were found superficial. The first and foremost criticism was against the fact that almost no limitation was imposed on the Presidential powers, despite the limitation on the term of office.

After the point arrived, none of the groups uprising in Syria will accept a solution package, in which Bashar Assad, his family and his immediate circle are found. The revolts will continue until the Assad regime leaves the power. Therefore, steps like constitutional amendment can never produce solution. The Syria opposition, which took further courage after the Tunis meeting, will fight to the end. In return, the Assad administration does not give any sign at the point of taking a pragmatic step to enable a peaceful transition. It appears that the regime struggling to survive will fight to the end. In an environment where international intervention cannot be mentioned, the unstability in Syria should be expected to expand in a long period.

Tuesday, February 28, 2012

Suriye için Yeni Yol Haritası: Tunus Toplantısı Sonuçları ve Anayasa Referandumu

Birleşmiş Milletler (BM) Güvenlik Konseyi’nde Arap Birliği’nin Suriye planının veto edilmesi ile birlikte Suriye’de değişimi savunan aktörler BM dışı çözüm arayışlarına yönelmiştir. Vetonun ardından “Suriye’nin Dostları” adı altında bir oluşuma gidilmiş ve böylece Rusya ve Çin’in itirazları aşılarak alternatif uluslararası mekanizmalar yolu ile Suriye’de siyasal değişimi mümkün kılmak amaçlanmıştır. Bu çerçevede “Suriye'nin Dostları” grubu ilk toplantısını 24 Şubat 2012 tarihinde Tunus'ta gerçekleştirmiştir. Toplantıya 70’den fazla ülkenin temsilcisi katılmış, Rusya ve Çin beklendiği üzere toplantıya temsilci göndermemiştir. Toplantı sonucunda, bir sonraki toplantının Türkiye'de ve üçüncü toplantının da Fransa'da yapılması kararlaştırılmıştır. Ayrıca BM’nin eski Genel Sekreteri Kofi Annan, Suriye özel temsilcisi olarak atanmıştır.

Tunus toplantısında alınan kararlar dünya gündeminin en üst sırasında oturan Suriye sorunu konusunda bundan sonra neler yaşanacağına, Esad rejimine karşı uluslararası toplumun hangi adımları atacağına ışık tutmaktadır. Toplantı sonucunda bir sonuç bildirgesi yayınlanmıştır. Burada öne çıkan başlıklar şu şekildedir:

- Suriye'nin toprak bütünlüğüne, egemenliğine milli birlik ve bağımsızlığına verilen önem vurgulanmıştır.

- Suriye rejimi tarafından sürdürülen geniş çaplı ve sistematik insan hakları ihlalleri, sivillere yönelik şiddet, cinsel saldırılar, hükümlülere uygulanan işkenceler şiddetli bir şekilde kınanmıştır.

- Arap Birliği'nin sorunun barışçıl çözümüne ilişkin ortaya koyduğu öneri desteklenmiş, burada yer alan şiddetin durdurulması, mahkumların salıverilmesi, tankların ve askerlerin şehirlerden çekilmesi, barışçı gösterilere izin verilmesi talepleri yinelenmiştir.

- Suriye'de tüm kesimleri içine alan bir ulusal birlik hükümeti kurulması çağrısında bulunulmuştur. Arap Birliği planı çerçevesindeki demokratik, çoğulcu, eşit, siyasi geçiş süreci için taraflar arasında diyalog ve milli birlik hükümetinin kurulması, Arap Birliği ve diğer uluslararası kuruluşların gözetiminde şeffaf ve özgür seçimlerin gerçekleşmesi taleplerine destek verilmiştir.

- Suriye'nin Dostları Grubu olarak, şiddetin durdurulması amacıyla Suriye rejimine karşı siyasi, ekonomik, diplomatik yaptırımlarla baskı uygulamaya devam edileceği vurgulanmıştır.

Toplantı sonucunda her ne kadar yaptırımlar öne çıkmış olsa da askeri önlemlerin önünü açabilecek bazı öneriler gündeme gelmiştir. Sonuç bildirisinde, Suriye'deki insani duruma değinilerek, “BM ve diğer kuruluşlar aracılığıyla Humus ve diğer şehirlere insani yardım girişine izin verilmesi çağrısında” bulunulmuştur. İnsani yardım gönderilebilmesi için BM’den karar çıkması ve buna Suriye'nin izin vermesi gerekmektedir. Suriye yönetiminin buna yanaşmaması durumunda tek taraflı olarak yardımın ulaştırılması söz konusu olacaktır. Bu da askeri korumayı gerektiren bir insani yardım koridorunu gündeme getirir. Dışişleri Bakanı Davutoğlu da toplantı sonrasında yaptığı açıklamada “insani trajedi devam ederse diğer alternatifler gündeme gelebilir.” diyerek olası askeri önlemlerin işaretini vermiştir. Suudi Arabistan Dışişleri Bakanı Prens Suud el Faysal “muhalifleri silahlandırmanın harika bir fikir” olduğu şeklinde bir yaklaşımda bulunarak ülkesinin daha sert önlemler alma konusundaki iradesini ortaya koymuştur. Askeri tedbirleri gündeme getiren bir diğer lider Tunus Cumhurbaşkanı Munsif Marzuki olmuştur. Marzuki, “diplomatik çabalara eşlik etmesi için, Suriye’de bir Arap gücü kurulması” çağrısında bulunmuştur.

Suriye Halkının Meşru “Bir” Temsilcisi Olarak Suriye Ulusal Konseyi

Tunus toplantısının en önemli sonuçlarından biri Suriye'nin Dostları Grubu olarak, “Suriye Ulusal Konseyi (SUK)’nin demokratik ve barışçı bir değişim arayan Suriye halkının meşru bir temsilcisi” olarak kabul edilmesi olmuştur. Böylece SUK uluslararası meşruiyet kazanmıştır. Tanımada “tek temsilcisi” yerine “bir temsilcisi” ifadesi yer almıştır. Libya'daki süreçte de muhalifler ilk önce “bir temsilci” sonrasında ise “tek meşru temsilci” olarak tanınmıştı. Tunus Dışişleri Bakanı’na göre de bir sonraki aşamada SUK “tek meşru temsilci” olarak tanınacaktır.

En geniş çaplı siyasal muhalif yapılanma olma özelliğini taşıyan Suriye Ulusal Konseyi’nin Suriye halkının meşru temsilcisi olarak tanınması Suriye sorununda son derece önemli bir aşamaya işaret etmektedir. Zira artık uluslararası toplumun büyük bir bölümü SUK’u muhatap kabul edecek, böylece yalnızlaşan Esad yönetimi daha da izole olacaktır.

SUK’un meşru temsilci kabul edilmesi ile Suriye’de olası bir rejim değişikliğinde bu yapının etkin bir siyasal aktör olacağını göstermektedir. Dolayısıyla SUK’un Suriye sorununa nasıl bir çözüm önerdiği, nasıl bir siyasal programa sahip olduğu soruları Esad rejiminin yıkılış sürecine ve Esad sonrası Suriye siyasal yaşamının nasıl şekilleneceğine ışık tutmaktadır. SUK toplantı sonrasında yayınladığı bildiri ile kritik konulardaki siyasal yaklaşımını ve siyasal sürecin nasıl gelişeceğine ilişkin görüşlerini paylaşmıştır. Buna göre;

SUK, iki ayaklı çözüm arayışında olduğunu ortaya koymuştur. Birinci ayak “acil insani yardım” ikinci ayak ise “barışçıl bir geçiş için siyasal sürecin takip edilmesidir.” Bu stratejinin insani yardım ayağı esasen askeri önlemleri de içermektedir. Zira insani yardımların Suriye halkına ulaştırılması kapsamında “güvenli insani yardım koridorları” ya da “güvenli bölgeler” oluşturulması önerilmektedir. Güvenli bölgelerin oluşturulması ile bir yandan sivil halkın güvenliği sağlanmaya çalışılırken diğer taraftan muhaliflerin daha rahat organize olabilecekleri bir alan arayışında oldukları görülmektedir.

Siyasal sürecin desteklenmesi boyutunda ise “sivil halka yardım edilmesi ve yardımların koordine edilmesi için ülkenin farklı bölgelerinde yerel konseylerin oluşturulması” önerilmektedir. SUK böylece alternatif bir devlet yapılanmasının hazırlıklarına başlamak istemektedir. Bu şekilde Esad sonrası kaos ve kargaşanın önüne geçilmeye çalışılmaktadır. Esad sonrası düzenin korunması hedefi çerçevesinde ülkelerin Suriye muhalefetine askeri yardımlarının sınırlanmaması önerisinde bulunmuştur. Yine aynı çerçevede, Suriye sınırlarından geçişlerin kontrol altına alınması konusunda yardım beklediğini ortaya koymuştur. Burada temel beklenti ülkede Esad sonrası karışıklıktan faydalanmak isteyecek aşırı İslami grupların ülkeye girişlerinin engellenmesidir.

Muhalefet Suriye yönetimi içinde “kabul edilebilir üyelerle müzakere yolunun açık olduğunu” belirterek barışçıl geçiş için hazır olduğunu belirtmiştir. Ancak “kabul edilebilir” ifadesi kullanılarak “kabul edilemez” üyeler şeklinde bir ayrım yapıldığı da anlaşılmıştır. Böylece müzakereler için önkoşul olarak Esad ailesi ve yakın çevresinin iktidardan uzaklaştırılması öne sürülmüştür. SUK, işledikleri suçlardan dolayı cezalandırılacakları ikiye ayırmaktadır. Birinci grup kesinlikle tolere edilmeyecek kişilerdir. Diğer bazı yetkililerin görevlerine son verilmesi ancak ülkede yaşamaya devam etmelerine izin verileceği belirtilmektedir. Esad yönetiminin mevcut şartlar altında bu koşulları kabul etmeyeceği düşünülürse barışçıl geçiş ihtimalinin neredeyse sıfır olduğu görülmektedir.

Muhalefet öncelikli gündeminin bir birlik hükümeti kurulması olduğunu belirtmektedir. Hükümetin öncelikli görevi de güvenlik yapılanmasının yeniden yapılandırılması, anayasanın değiştirilmesi, kamu kurumlarının yeniden yapılandırılması olacaktır. Böylece geçiş sürecinde halka hizmete devam edilebilmesi ve düzenin korunması amaçlanmaktadır. Geçici ulusal birlik hükümetinde şu anda yönetim için yer alan ve suça karışmamış kişiler, muhaliflerden temsilciler ve devrim komitelerinden temsilcilerin olacağı vurgulanmıştır. Bu hükümet ülkeyi “Kurucu Meclis”i oluşturacak olan seçimlere götürecektir. Kurucu Meclis de ülkeyi 1-1.5 yıl içinde parlamento ve Devlet Başkanlığı seçimine götürecektir.

SUK, Suriye toplumunu oluşturan tüm etnik (Kürtler, Süryaniler ve diğerleri) ve dinsel (Hıristiyanlar, Aleviler, Dürziler ve diğerleri) gruplara gerekli güvencelerin verileceğini açıklayarak tüm toplumsal grupları muhalif kampa çekmeye çalışmıştır. Güvenliklerinin ve anayasal tüm haklarının garanti altına alınacağı belirtilmiştir. SUK siyasal programında tüm toplum üyelerinin vatandaşlık temelinde eşit haklara sahip olacağı taahhüdünde bulunmuştur. Rejimin ülkedeki Alevi toplumunu rehin aldığını belirten SUK, rejimin yıkılması sonrasında bu toplumun güvenliğinin sağlanması konusunda güvenlik güçlerinin gerekli korumayı sağlayacağı güvencesi vermiştir. Bu arada, konferansa katılan SUK Başkanı Burhan Galyun, Esad rejiminin devrilmesi halinde ülkede merkeziyetçilikten uzak bir yönetim kurulacağını açıklamıştır. Bu ifadenin yanı sıra ülkenin sosyal gerçeklerini de dikkate aldığımızda yeni Suriye’nin ademi merkeziyetçi bir yapıya sahip olacağı görülmektedir. Galyun bu açıklaması ile şu ana kadar Esad yönetimine karşı ciddi bir ayaklanma hareketine girişmeyen Suriyeli Kürtleri ve Arap Alevileri muhalif kampa çekmeye çalışmıştır. Aşırı merkezi olmayan yeni yönetim biçiminde toplumsal gruplar kendi bölgelerinde belli bir otonomiye sahip olabilecektir.

Esad’dan Karşı Hamle: Yeni Anayasa Referandumu

“Suriye’nin Dostları” Grubu bir taraftan yaptırım kararları alırken Suriye’de yönetim karşıtı gösteriler de devam etmektedir. Her gün yüze yakın sivil, bombardımanlar ve açılan ateş neticesinde hayatını kaybetmektedir. Suriye rejiminin üzerindeki baskının giderek arttığı bu ortamda Devlet Başkanı Esad’dan bir karşı hamle gelmiştir. Suriye hafta sonu yeni anayasa için sandık başına gitmiştir. Yönetimin halkı oy kullanmaya çağırmasına karşılık muhalifler boykot çağrısında bulunmuştur. Yeni anayasa Suriye Devlet Başkanı Beşar Esad’ın görevlendirdiği bir komite tarafından hazırlanmıştı. Yeni anayasanın getireceği en büyük yenilik, Baas partisinin mutlak hakimiyeti maddesinin kaldırılarak çok partili sisteme geçiliyor olmasıdır. Ayrıca devlet başkanının görev süresi de yedişer yıllık en fazla iki dönemle sınırlandırılmaktadır. Suriye hükümeti Anayasa değişikliğinin kabul edilmesi halinde 90 gün içinde çok partili genel seçimlerin yapılacağı sözünü de vermiştir. Bu adım Suriye yönetiminin de artık statükonun olduğu gibi devamının mümkün olmadığını anlamaya başladığını göstermektedir. Ancak olaylar ilk başladığında sonuç vermesi ihtimali bulunan bu tarz girişimlerin artık ayaklanmanın durdurulması bağlamında başarı sağlaması mümkün değildir. Zaten muhalif kanattan gelen ilk açıklamalar da bu yöndedir. Muhalifler, çok partili sistemin önü açılsa da sadece iktidara yakın grupların parti kurmasına izin verileceğini düşünmektedir. Ayrıca diğer değişiklikler de yüzeysel bulunmuştur. En başta gelen eleştiri Devlet Başkanının görev süresinin sınırlanmasına karşılık yetkilerinde neredeyse hiçbir kısıtlama getirilmemesi olmuştur.

Esasen gelinen noktadan sonra Suriye’de ayaklanan kesimlerin hiçbiri Beşar Esad, ailesi ve yakın çevresinin içinde olduğu bir çözüm paketini kabul etmeyecektir. Ayaklanmalar Esad yönetimi iktidarı bırakana dek sürecektir. Dolayısıyla anayasa değişikliği gibi adımların sonuç üretmesi mümkün değildir. Tunus toplantısı ile beraber daha da cesaretlenen Suriye muhalefeti sonuna kadar mücadele edecektir. Buna karşılık Esad yönetimi de barışçıl geçişe imkan verecek pragmatik bir adım atma noktasında hiçbir işaret vermemektedir. Ölüm kalım savaşı veren rejim sonuna kadar savaşacak gibidir. Uluslararası müdahalenin de konuşulamadığı bir ortamda Suriye’de istikrarsızlığın uzun bir sürece yayılması beklenmelidir.

Thursday, February 23, 2012

The Perspective of Russia Towards The Arab Revolution and The Syrian Problem: The Conclusions of The Valdai Forum

On 17-18 February, the third conference of the Middle East Section of Valdai International Discussion Club was held in Sochi, Russia. The prominent participants from Russia, Turkey, the Middle East, the USA, the Europe and the Asia have attended in the conference entitled “Transformation in the Middle East and Russia’s Interests”. Russian Federation Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov delivered the opening speech. For two days, more than eighty experts discussed the transformation in the Middle East, the lessons learned from the Libya case, the role of Islam in popular movements, the winners and the losers of the Arab Spring, the Middle East peace process, scenarios for the upcoming period and solution proposals for a peaceful transition. As well as these are the main themes, the Syrian problem was the most prominent theme in each session. Turkey was located in the center due to the discussions of playing a central role in Syria and a model for governance in the region. Through this conference, the Russian side had the opportunity to observe both the perspectives about the developments in the Middle East of the participants coming from the region and how the actors that have an influence on the process perceive the change in the Middle East and according to what conditions those actors adopt a position. Besides, it had a chance to express the position of Russia to the opinion leaders of all the actors.

The first impression from the statements in the sessions and the discussions during the pauses is that Russia is likely to be worried, frustrated and resistant about Syria and ready for all kind of scenarios. In the opening speech Russian Federation Deputy Foreign Minister revealed that they view the incidents differently in every country by describing some of the popular movements as a revolution and some of them as a rebellion. They clearly presented that they do not regard the developments as a revolutionary movement particularly in Syria. The Russian side also indicated in its following statements that they view the armed groups and the external influences as the resource of the instability in Syria, rather than the regime itself. Although they did not mention specifically, they implied that both Free Syrian Army and possibly the role played by the USA, France, Turkey and the Gulf countries. The Deputy Minister’s statements: “We live in the region. We are not out of the region and we have to find a solution for us” served as a message both for the West “not to interfere with the Syria problem externally” and for the region “not to cooperate with the West about the Syrian issue”. Thus, Russia put forward its aim to find solutions through the regional initiatives into the problem. It is also stated by a high-level official that they are against an international intervention. Bogdanov remarked that despite the instability in Syria it is now better than the incidents in case of possible an intervention and the Libya example sets a good lesson in this respect. Russia is obviously in search of solving the problem by means of Syria and the region. For this reason, they advocate a dialogue process between the regime and the opposition as a procedure to follow. Within this framework, it had importance that Bogdanov indicated they negotiated with the Syrian opposition. Above all, with these statements, Russia proved that they try not to let the West take the control of the progress in Syria. However, the other important inference of this statement is that Russia has recognized that the former regime has no chance to survive as it used to and put pressure on the regime to make some expansion. On the other hand, the negotiations with the opposition show us that Russia makes efforts just in case after Assad.The fact that the opposition puts forward the withdrawal of Assad family and its kin from the power as a precondition, however, poses challenges for Russia. Bogdanov stated that they support “a negotiation process without preconditions” between the sides. Probably, the precondition of the pro-regime side is that they will not negotiate with any armed groups, since the Russian Deputy Minister told about their expectations that the Syrian opposition ought to keep its distance with the armed groups. In parallel, all of the other Russian participants also provided the pro-status quo attitude in Syria and sought to present rightful justifications. The argument according to a public opinion poll in Qatar that the majority of the Syrian people supports that Assad regime, was consistently accentuated. In other words, Russia perceives the problem as an instability caused by the criminal organizations with foreign support rather than a legitimacy issue. Russia, emphasizing that the West is practicing double standard since it does not put pressure on many regional countries that are not ruled by democracy, claims that the West poses a problem which does not exist in other regional countries by putting forward the question why there is no incidents in these countries. The statements of a Russian participant that many segments in the country view the Bashar al-Assad’s presence as their security assurance and they are on the regime’s,side therefore, all actors are supposed to guarantee the lives and the positions of aforementioned groups, were an important analysis for the solution of the problem.

Because the Syria was at the top of the agenda, the comments of two Syrians, one from Syria, the other one from abroad, were noted carefully. The main conclusion of two spokesmen’s statements is that the Syrians also have no idea about what is going on in Syria. The statement of Prof. Dr. Elias Samo from the University of Aleppo that “the greatest victim in Syria is the reality itself”, was the best explanation to describe the situation. The other conclusion is that the great majority of the population is in agreement about the change being peaceful. Everyone thinks that a sudden and radical change will cause more violence than the present situation. According to the explanation of Samo, the Syrian silent majority has an expectation in this way. Samir Taqi, chairman in a research center and living in Dubai, claimed that the regime has lost the control in 50% of Syria. Taqi defended that Russia ought to take an active role for a peaceful change without any foreign intervention in the country and a regional initiative including Turkey and the Gulf countries ought to be launched.

The Israeli participants’ comments showed that the developments in Syria are viewed as both an opportunity and a risk by Israel. As for that, a weak, divided Syria is assumed as an opportunity since it will not pose a threat in long term. On the other hand, the possibility that the regime may play the trump card to maintain its existence by attacking Israel provided it recognizes that it will collapse, has been assessed. Besides, it is thought that the mass destruction weapons, which Syria is believed to have, may be captured and used against Israel by some “irresponsible groups” in case the regime collapses. Israel takes into account that the conventional balance on behalf of Israel will be upset in case of a chaos in Syria, on the contrary the non-state actors that they cannot control may emerge as a new threat. Besides, losing some allies following the Arab Spring, the rising power of political Islam and the prevalence of the long-term instability in the region are also assessed as a threat.

The other prominent theme in the conference is the political Islam and the discussion that Turkey can become a model with regards to the Middle Eastern countries. Everyone accepted that the Islamic movements have gained power in the region. It was also discussed how these movements, which remained in the opposition for ages, will take a stand and what solutions they produce for concrete problems. It is generally accepted that Turkey has a democracy experience based on long years and thus, Turkey’s model cannot be practiced directly as a model for the region. It is stated that Turkey may serve as an example to show that “an Islamic movement can come to power through legitimate ways.” Many participants referred the evaluation of Mesut Yılmaz, the former Prime Minister of Turkey, that “the Islamic movements in Turkey gained their current position by competing for a long time within the rules of the democratic regime.” Yaşar Yakış, the former Foreign Minister of Turkey, made an objection to the “Islamic democracy” term and indicated that it would be appropriate to use the term “a democratic country of which the majority of the population formed by the Muslims.” Otherwise, these two explanations will bring along different perspectives and results. Another prominent subject in the Islam and democracy discussions is the question that “the Islamic movements can produce solutions for current issues or not.” One of the participants revealed the given expectations by stating that “people did not vote for the Islamic parties to have a place in heaven, yet to find solutions for daily problems and to have better living conditions.” It is said that the other element that make Turkey to be discussed as a model is the increase in its economic growth rate under the leadership of an Islamic movement. The opinion that the rising power of the Islamic movements either causes problems as long as they are alienated from the power or make them act more responsibly and adopt an all-embracing policy when they come to power, came into prominence.

In conclusion, there were different reactions about the perspective of Turkey’s attitude towards the Syrian issue. Some Syrian and regional participants, who supports the peaceful change in Syria, stated their disappointment about Turkey that it is supposed to be more patient for a peaceful transition and make an effort for it. All the more amazing, the supporters of the regime change are disappointed as well. According to them, Turkey ought to contribute more to the political and military opposition in Syria. Even this proves us how rough the Syria problem is and that it includes dilemmas.

Tuesday, February 21, 2012

Rusya’dan Arap Devrimi ve Suriye Sorunu’na Bakış: Valdai Forum Sonuçları

17-18 Şubat 2012 tarihlerinde “Valdai Tartışma Kulübü, Ortadoğu Bölümü” toplantılarının üçüncüsü Rusya’nın Soçi kentinde düzenlendi. “Ortadoğu’da Dönüşüm ve Rusya’nın Çıkarları” başlıklı toplantıya Rusya, Türkiye, Ortadoğu, ABD, Avrupa ve Asya’dan seçkin konuklar katıldı. Toplantının açılışı Rusya Dışişleri Bakan Yardımcısı Mikhail Bogdanov’un yaptığı konuşma ile gerçekleşti. İki gün boyunca konularında uzman 80’i aşkın katılımcı altı ayrı oturumda Ortadoğu’da değişimi, Libya örneğinden çıkarılan dersleri, halk hareketlerinden İslam’ın rolünü, Arap Baharı’nın kazanan ve kaybedenlerini, Ortadoğu Barış sürecini, bundan sonraki döneme ilişkin senaryoları ve barışçıl bir geçiş için çözüm önerilerini tartıştı. Ana temalar bunlar olmakla birlikte Suriye sorunu her oturumda en fazla öne çıkan konu oldu. Türkiye de, hem Suriye konusunda oynadığı merkezi rol hem de bölgeye model olma tartışmaları nedeniyle merkezi konuma sahipti. Toplantı ile Rusya tarafı hem Ortadoğu’daki gelişmeler konusunda bölgeden gelenlerin soruna bakışlarını ve süreç üzerinde etkili aktörlerin Ortadoğu’daki değişimi nasıl algıladıklarını ve neye göre pozisyon aldıklarını öğrenme fırsatı elde etmiş oldu. Bunun yanı sıra tüm aktörlerin kanaat önderlerine de Rusya’nın pozisyonunu ifade edebilme şansı elde etti.

Oturumlarda yapılan açıklamalar ve aralarda yapılan görüşmelerden elde edilen ilk izlenim Rusya’nın Suriye konusunda bir endişe, kızgınlık, direnme ve her türlü senaryoya karşı hazırlıklı olma duygusu içinde olduğudur. Rus Dışişleri Bakan Yardımcısı açılış konuşmasında Ortadoğu’da yaşanan halk hareketlerinin bazılarını devrim bazılarını ayaklanma olarak nitelendirerek her ülkedeki olaya farklı baktıklarını ortaya koymuş oldu. Özellikle Suriye’deki gelişmeleri gerçek bir devrim hareketi olarak görmediklerini net olarak belirttiler. Rus tarafı daha sonraki açıklamalarında da Suriye’deki istikrarsızlığın kaynağı olarak rejimden ziyade içerdeki silahlı gruplar ve dış etkileri gördüğünü belirtti. Ülke adı vermemekle birlikte burada hem Özgür Suriye Ordusu hem de muhtemelen ABD, Fransa, Türkiye ve Körfez ülkelerinin oynadığı rol kast edildi. Bakan Yardımcısı’nın “biz bölgede yaşıyoruz. Bölge dışından değiliz ve kendimiz bir çözüm bulmalıyız” ifadeleri hem Batı’ya “dışarıdan Suriye sorununa karışma” hem de bölgeye “Batı ile Suriye konusunda işbirliği yapma” mesajıydı. Rusya böylece soruna bölgesel girişimler yoluyla çözüm bulma isteğini ortaya koymuş oldu. Bir uluslararası müdahaleye karşı olunduğu da üst düzeyden dile getirildi. Bogdanov, konuşmasında “Suriye’de istikrarsızlık sürse de olası bir müdahalede yaşanacakların şimdiki olayları aratabileceği” şeklinde bir yorumda bulundu ve Libya örneğinin bu açıdan iyi bir ders olduğunu ifade etti. Rusya, açıkça sorunun Suriye ve bölge içinden çözülmesi arayışındadır. Bunun için izlenecek yol olarak rejim ve muhalefet arasında bir diyalog sürecinin başlatılmasını savunmaktadır. Bu çerçevede Bogdanov’un “Suriyeli muhaliflerle de görüştüklerini” belirtmesi önemliydi. Rusya bu ifadelerle her şeyden önce Suriye’de süreci Batı’nın kontrolüne bırakmama çabasında olduğunu göstermiş oldu. Ancak bu ifadeden çıkarılabilecek bir diğer önemli tespit Rusya’nın da artık eski sistemin olduğu şekliyle devam etme şansının olmadığını görmesi ve rejime bazı açılımlar yapma konusunda baskı oluşturduğudur. Diğer taraftan muhaliflerle görüşme her olasılığa karşın Esad sonrasına ilişkin Rusya’nın da çabalarının olduğunu göstermektedir. Rusya’nın bu yaklaşımını sıkıntıya sokan muhalefetin Esad ailesi ve yakın çevresinin iktidardan çekilmesini ön koşul olarak öne sürmesidir. Bogdanov bundan dolayı taraflar arasında “önkoşulsuz bir müzakere sürecinden yana olduklarını” ifade etmiştir. Muhtemelen rejim kanadının önkoşulu ise silahlı hiçbir grup ile müzakere etmeyeceğidir. Zira Rus Bakan Yardımcısı “Suriye muhalefetinin silahlı gruplarla arasına mesafe koyması gerektiği” şeklindeki beklentilerini dile getirmiştir. Diğer tüm Rus katılımcılar da paralel şekilde Suriye’de statükodan yana aldıkları tavra meşru gerekçeler sunmaya çalışmıştır. Katar’da yapılan bir kamuoyu araştırmasının “Suriye halkının çoğunluğunun Esad’ın iktidarda kalmasını savunduğunu” gösterdiği savı sürekli olarak dile getirilmiştir. Yani Rusya sorunu bir meşruiyet sorunundan ziyade dışarıdan destek alan Suriye içindeki suç örgütlerinin istikrarsızlık yaratması olarak algılamaktadır. Demokrasi ile yönetilmeyen birçok bölge ülkesine Batı’nın baskı yapmamasını bir çifte standart olarak vurgulayan Rusya “bu ülkelerde neden bir olay yaşanmadığı” sorusunu ortaya atarak “Batı’nın diğer bölge ülkelerinde olmayan bir sorunu yarattıkları” şeklinde bir iddiayı ortaya atmaktadır. Bir Rus katılımcının “ülkede birçok kesim Beşar Esad’ın varlığını kendi güvenliklerinin güvencesi olarak düşünüyor ve bu nedenle rejimin yanında duruyor. Bu nedenle bütün aktörlerin söz konusu gruplara yaşamları veya konumları konusunda güvenceler vermesi gerekiyor” şeklindeki ifadeleri sorunun çözümüne yönelik önemli bir tespitti.

Ana gündem maddesi Suriye olduğu için biri Suriye ve diğeri ülke dışında yaşayan iki Suriyeli katılımcının yorumları dikkatle not edildi. İki yorumcunun konuşmalarından ortaya çıkan temel sonuç “Suriye’de tam olarak ne olup bittiği konusunda Suriyelilerin de net bilgi sahibi olmadığıdır.” Halep Üniversitesi’nden Prof. Dr. Elias Samo’nun “Suriye’de en büyük kurban gerçeğin kendisidir” sözleri bu durumu yansıtan en güzel ifadeler oldu. Bir diğer sonuç ise ülkenin büyük çoğunluğunun değişimin barışçıl olması konusunda hemfikir olduklarıdır. Herkes ani ve radikal bir değişimin mevcut durumdan daha fazla şiddet doğuracağını düşünüyor. Samo’nun ifadesi ile “Suriye’nin sessiz çoğunluğunun beklentisi bu şekildedir.” Dubai’de yaşayan ve bir araştırma merkezinin başkanlığını yürüten Samir Taqi ise “rejimin Suriye’nin yaklaşık %50’sinde kontrolü kaybettiği” tespitinde bulundu. Taqi, ülkenin yabancı müdahalesine maruz kalmadan barışçıl bir değişim yaşaması için Rusya’nın aktif rol alması gerektiğini ve içinde Türkiye ve Körfez ülkelerinin de olduğu bir bölgesel girişimin hayata geçirilmesi gerektiğini savundu.

İsrailli katılımcıların yorumları ise Suriye’deki gelişmelerin İsrail tarafından hem bir fırsat hem risk olarak algılandığını ortaya koydu. Buna göre zayıflamış, kendi içinde bölünmüş bir Suriye uzunca bir süre tehdit oluşturamayacak olması nedeniyle fırsat olarak algılanmaktadır. Diğer taraftan rejimin yıkılacağını anlaması durumunda son koz olarak İsrail’e saldırı yoluyla ayakta kalma kartını oynayabileceği ihtimali değerlendirilmektedir. Bunun yanı sıra rejim yıkılırsa Suriye ordusunun elinde olduğuna inanılan kitle imha silahlarının “sorumsuz” grupların eline geçerek İsrail’e karşı kullanılabileceği düşünülmektedir. İsrail, Suriye’de bir kaos yaşanması durumunda kendi lehlerine olan konvansiyonel dengenin bozulacağını buna karşılık kontrol edemeyebilecekleri devlet dışı güçlerin yeni bir tehdit olarak ortaya çıkabileceğini hesaplamaktadır. Bunların yanı sıra; Arap Baharı ile beraber bazı müttefiklerin kaybedilmesi, siyasal İslam’ın güç kazanması ve uzun süreli istikrarsızlığın bölgeye hakim olması da tehdit olarak değerlendirilmektedir.

Toplantıda öne çıkan konulardan biri de siyasal İslam ve Türkiye’nin Ortadoğu ülkeleri açısından model olup olamayacağı tartışması olmuştur. Bölgede İslami hareketlerin güç kazandığı herkes tarafından kabul edilmiştir. Uzun yıllardır muhalefette kalan bu hareketlerin iktidarı ele geçirince nasıl tavır alacakları, somut sorunlara nasıl çözümler üretecekleri ele alınmıştır. Genel kabul Türkiye’nin uzun yıllara dayalı demokrasi tecrübesine sahip olduğu ve bu nedenle Türkiye modelinin bölge açısından doğrudan bir model olarak uygulanmasının mümkün olmadığı olmuştur. Türkiye’nin “bir İslami hareketin meşru yollarla iktidara gelinebileceğini göstermesi açısından” örnek olabileceği ifade edilmiştir. Türkiye eski Başbakanı Mesut Yılmaz’ın “Türkiye’de İslami hareketler çok uzun süreler demokratik rejimin kuralları içinde mücadele ederek mevcut konuma geldikleri” şeklindeki saptamasına birçok katılımcı tarafından atıf yapılmıştır. Dışişleri eski Bakanı Yaşar Yakış da “Türkiye için kullanılan İslami demokrasi kavramına itiraz ederek, “nüfusunun çoğunluğu Müslüman olan demokratik bir ülke” kavramının kullanılmasının doğru olacağını belirtmiştir. Zira bu iki tanımlama farklı bakış ve sonuçları beraberinde getirecektir. İslam ve demokrasi tartışmalarında öne çıkan bir diğer konu “İslami hareketlerin güncel sorunlara çözümler üretip üretemeyecekleri” olmuştur. Ortadoğu’dan gelen bir katılımcının “insanlar İslami partilere cennette bir yer kapmak için değil günlük sorunlarına çözüm bulunması ve daha iyi yaşam koşulları için oy verdi” şeklindeki ifadesi söz konusu beklentiyi ortaya koymuştur. Türkiye’nin model olarak tartışılmasını sağlayan bir diğer unsurun, ülkede İslami bir hareket liderliğinde ekonomik kalkınmışlık hızının artması olduğu dile getirilmiştir. İslami hareketlerin güç kazanması ise iktidardan dışlandıklarında radikalleşme sorunu yarattığı gibi iktidara gelmenin de bu hareketleri daha sorumlu davranmaya iteceği ve tüm toplumu kapsayıcı politikalar benimsemeye iteceği görüşü ağırlık kazanmıştır.

Son olarak Türkiye’nin Suriye konusundaki tutumuna bakış hakkında farklı tepkiler gelmiştir. Suriye’de barışçıl değişimi savunan Suriyeli ve bölgeden bazı katılımcılar Türkiye’nin barışçıl geçiş için daha fazla sabretmesi ve çaba sarf etmesi yönündeki hayal kırıklıklarını dile getirdi. İşin ilginç tarafı Suriye’de rejim değişikliğinin savunanların da yine hayal kırıklığı içinde olmasıdır. Onlara göre de Türkiye, Suriye siyasal ve askeri muhalefetine daha fazla destek vermelidir. Bu bile Suriye sorununun Türkiye açısından ne kadar sıkıntılı ve ikilemler içeren bir konu olduğunu göstermektedir.

Tuesday, February 14, 2012

Syria’s PKK Game

Clues about allegations regarding that recently Syria and PKK have gotten closer to one another will be strived to be searched through archive review and discourse analysis methods in this study. To this end; news on Turkish press, analyses taking place in news agencies close to PKK, and the statements of PKK and leaders from Democratic Union Party (PYD) which is its political wing in Syria will be used as basis. The conclusions at the end of the research are as follows: The news, which are rather related to the intelligence, on Turkish press put forward that “In recent months, Syria has been providing PKK terrorist organization with area of movement, even if it is not at the same level as it was in 1980's and 1990's”. When the statements of PKK and PYD leaders are evaluated in accordance with discourse analysis, it is seen that these statements are such as to support “an increasing approach between Syria and PKK”. And the third conclusion reached is that, “Within the framework of an effort to have an influence on the Syrian Kurds, there has been a rivalry between PKK and North Iraq (particularly KDP).”

It can be suggested that roughly there is a double split among the Syrian Kurds in terms of political influence. The first is the group, which is led by PYD that is the political extension of PKK in Syria and PKK itself. This group has a critical approach against Syrian opponents and opponent organizations, which were organized abroad and argue for breakdown of the Assad regime. Even though they do not want to be seen too close to the Assad administration, they strive to monopolize the Syrian Kurds by taking advantage of the current weak position of the regime. A tactical cooperation between this group and the regime could be mentioned. Within this scope, while the regime provides PYD with area of movement in Kurdish regions again, PYD use its influence on the Kurds in favor of the regime. And the group, which is against PYD and which adopted a critical approach against the regime, acts in unison with the Syrian opposition while striving to receive a foreign support from North Iraq. The political representative of this group is the Kurdistan National Assembly of Syria, which is led by Abdul Hakim Bashar and composed of 11 parties. While these two groups compete with each others, on the other hand, they try to secure their positions inside by receiving supports of different regional actors. In this study, all these aforesaid allegations and assumptions will be strived to be based on a ground.

Back to the Past in Turkey-Syria Relations: Signals of Syria-PKK Cooperation

After the civil unrest emerged in Syria on March 15th 2011, the first signal of cooperation between the Assad regime and PKK was seen in an analysis of the Fırat News Agency, which is known for its close relations with PKK. According to this analysis, “The mistakes of AKP in foreign policy opened new areas to PKK. These mistakes expanded PKK's room for maneuver. Above all, the area ranging from Iran, Iraq, Syria to Lebanon was thoroughly opened to PKK.”[1] What is meant here by the mistakes of AK Party is probably AKP's anti-Assad approach related to the events in Syria. In the analysis, it was strived to be said that Turkey's “wrong” policies lead Syria and her supporter Iran to let anti-Turkey forces act more freely in their own areas of movement.

Within this process, an important development took place in Qamishli province of Syria. Meshal Temmo, one of the prominent leaders of Syrian Kurds, was assassinated in front of his house in Qamishli on October 7th, Friday. While reporting this news on Firat News Agency, such a statement was used: “Meshal Temmo, Kurdish member of Syrian National Council (SNC) established in Istanbul and supported by the Western powers and Turkey.” According to the same resource, Temmo “was one of the 7 people elected in the presidential council of the SNC declared in Istanbul, but it was not announced yet.[2] In all its statements, PYD described Kurdish representatives within SNC as “collaborator”.

Concerns regarding that Syria could start to support PKK again as she did before were mentioned by Turkish officials as well. In an analysis on Western media, referring to a Turkish official, “the fact that Syria supported PKK was reminded, and concerns about the possibility that Damascus could play the Kurdish problem card in order to provoke Turkey following the setback in relations between the parties” were mentioned.[3] Even if not explicitly, these concerns were implicitly mentioned by the highest level. Nobody suspected of the fact that the target was Iran and Syria, when Prime Minister Erdoğan stated that “Anyone who support or encourage the terrorist organization will all be called to account by all means” after the PKK attack organized in Çukurca. Another top-level statement came from President Abdullah Gül. Probably based on information in this direction, Gül strongly recommended to the Syrian party “not to involve in the PKK game.”[4] And Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu responded to a similar question by saying that “I do not believe Syria would make a mistake by using PKK.”[5] According to some allegations on Western media again, “Syrian intelligence service threatened Turkey by saying that 'We start to arm PKK again, if Erdoğan continues to interfere in our internal affairs'”.[6]

Within this process, another signal of Ba'ath-PKK approach came from Beirut. During the pro-Assad demonstration, which was organized in front of the Syrian Embassy in Beirut on October 31st 2011, PKK flags and posters of Abdullah Öcalan were unfurled. [7] An analysis on French Le Figaro journal more clearly put forth the details of this approach. According to this, “Syrian government started to support the Kurdish in the country to pose a threat to Turkey.” And this support was given to PKK and PYD, which is its political extension in Syria, already in good relations in the past; rather than to the whole Syrian Kurds. The most important indicator within this framework was the fact that PYD leader Saleh Mohammed Muslim, who was in exile for many years, was allowed to turn back to the country. PYD leader Saleh Muslim, who was officially called, appeared to participate in a meeting of the opponents tolerated by the regime in Damascus on September 17th. Muslim became the vice-chairman of the Syrian National Committee for Democratic Change, which gathered regime opponents rival to the Syrian National Assembly receiving the support of the Western. According to the author, the fact that PYD leader Saleh Mohammed Muslim was allowed to come back from the exile was a clear message for Turkey. In addition to this, the signals of the “initiative” were listed as follows: “Opening 6 new Kurdish schools, allowing Kurdish national anthem in these new schools, and giving Kurdish education.” According to the same news, “The fact that Muslim firstly became the member of National Committee for Democratic Change in a short while after he turned back from exile, and secondly he became the vice-chairman of the committee was not a coincidence.” PYD's giving permission to open three cultural centers and four Kurdish language schools in Aleppo, Qamishli and Malikiya was not possible until recently. Furthermore, the half of 640 PYD militants in Syrian prisons were released.[8] Kurdish leader Meshal Temmo's assassination was also considered as a part of this process. According to this, the Damascus regime gave the message that the new Kurdish formation killed the leader Meshal Temmo and gave the message that “good Kurd is a Kurd who is the member of PYD supported by the regime.”[9]

Another development in favor of the cooperation was the allegation that “PKK set up a new camp in Syrian district of Resulyan on Turkish borderline”. In the news based on Turkish intelligence units, it was stated that, “the camp, which was set up in a close distance from Ceylanpınar district of Şanlıurfa and where 150 members of the organization took part in, was set up upon the order of Fehman Hussein, one of the PKK leaders. The same news mentioned the fact that the Chief of the Army Hayri Kıvrıkoğlu came to Şanlıurfa and examined the borderline, in relation with the camp set up.[10]

Following the assassination of Meshal Fazel Temmo, leader of Future Movement Party; Abdullah Bedro, who was one of the most prominent leaders of the tribe in the region, was attacked in his own house in January. The attack, in which Bedro was severely wounded and his three sons were killed, was a sign showing that PKK started again its operations in Syria. Living in Qamishli province, Abdullah Bedro was the leader of one of the biggest tribes of the region, and he was also a former PKK sympathizer. Registering the titles of some houses on his own name for the organization to take shelter in when Öcalan used to live in Syria, Bedro was attacked upon the fact that the organization wanted to take the houses back and that he did not want to. According to the news on the Turkish media, “PKK, which transferred a part of its forces to the region to support Assad because of the political vacuum in Syria, especially pursued villas and apartments used by Abdullah Öcalan, with the strength taken from the Ba'ath regime. Within this framework, Abdullah Bedro was the first person strived to be called to account by the organization. The organization, which was after the former estates, wanted these estates to be given back to themselves and the argument turned into an armed conflict.”[11]

The organization, which did not want to assume the attack in the first place, had to admit it upon the revelation that PKK senior official Mahmoud Muhammed was killed during the attack. Bedro was one of the major tribal leaders of the region, known for his opposition to the Ba'ath administration in Qamishli province. According to the information on a Syrian Kurdish website, it was put forward that “Syrian leader Assad, who wanted to disable the Kurdish in order to weaken the power of public opposition, used PKK to that end.” In the news, it was also stated that “Syrian state strived to establish an absolute control over the Kurdish by giving PYD, which is the back-up power of PKK, unlimited opportunities. To that end, Syria provided all the appropriate conditions for Saleh Muslim, the PYD leader sentenced to a life imprisonment, to be released and freely act with a snap decision. Meshal Temmo's assassination was an action of this alliance as well.”[12]

Similar strong allegations also came from the Syrian opponents in Turkey. According to this, the Syrian government used Syrian wing of PKK against the opponents striving to overthrow President Bashar Assad. This card could also be played against Turkey in the near future. According to Syria's former ambassador to Sweden, Mohammad Bassam Imadi, who settled in Turkey and took part in Syrian opposition, “PYD strived to suppress the protests by acting together with the Assad regime.” Imadi put forward “the fact that Saleh Muslim Mohammed, the leader of PYD since 2010, was forbidden to enter in Syria before the uprising but that now this ban was lifted” is the most important basis of this allegation. Another elements supporting the same argument was PYD leader's statements regarding that “If Turkey interferes in Syria, then we fight against it.” [13]

The last indicator of the cooperation between the Assad regime and PKK appeared in photos published on some Kurdish websites. In this visual news, PYD supporter young people, whose faces were covered with masks chanting slogans in favor of PKK and Abdullah Öcalan, were interfering in the demonstrations organized by the Kurdish to protest the Assad administration. Another interesting dimension was the fact that these demonstrations were organized by the Kurdistan National Assembly of Syria, with whom they were rivals to each others. According to the news, people, whose faces were covered with masks, who had sticks and knives and who chanted slogans in favor of Abdullah Öcalan, randomly attacked against the demonstrators protesting against Bashar Assad. In the news, which was given based on the resources of Syrian Kurdish movements, “The opponent Kurdish movements other than PYD accused PYD of acting in unison with the Bashar Assad administration, in order to suppress the demonstrations in Syria.”[14]

In fact, Syrian leader Bashar Assad indirectly stated that they could play the Kurdish card against Turkey. In an interview Assad gave to the Western media, “Syria is center of the region. The fault line. If you fiddle with the ground a lot, you cause to an earthquake. A problem in Syria destroys the whole region. If the plan is to split Syria, then the whole region is split,” he said. [15] Everybody agreed on the fact that one of the addresses of these statements was Turkey. Syria's eagerness on this subject was clearly seen in journalist Cengiz Çandar's information given based on one of the senior officials of the Iraqi Kurdish government directly in contact with the Syrian government. According to this, the Syrian regime was extremely uncomfortable with Turkey's policies, and was in pursuit of paying it off. According to the Iraqi Kurdish official's statement, Syrian officials were saying that, “Playing the Kurdish card is not new for us, we know PKK very well.” In another anecdote Çandar gave by basing it upon some other resource, he cited from the statement of a prominent person from the immediate family of Bashar Assad to a foreign journalist saying that “Turkey hurts us, but we know how to hurt them and we will” and that he personally heard from the foreign journalist that the family member had referred to PKK.[16]

PYD's Outlook on Events in Syria and on Turkey

One of the major concerns of PYD is that civil unrest in Syria results in an international intervention. Because the movement thinks that such an intervention would be led by Turkey and that this situation would put an end to all its activities across the country. Therefore, all the opponent formations in exile such as the Syrian National Council (SNC) arguing for international intervention and every initiative Turkey is involved are opposed. The movement acts in unison with “National Committee for Democratic Change”, which is an internal opposition formation absolutely rejecting international intervention and having an approach that does not exceed red lines of the Assad regime.

These approaches were explicitly set forth in an interview of PYD leader Saleh Mohammed Muslim. Muslim claimed that, “Turkey has severe initiatives in order for the Kurdish in Syria do not get the best of the uprising process and Turkey's gathering the Syrian opponents is a part of this plan.” PYD expressed its distant approach towards the change movement in Syria through these statements of its leader Muslim: “As PYD, we believe that the international plan asking for a change in Syria is not in favor of the peoples.” In accordance with the PYD perception, “In return for assuming the leading role on Syria, Turkey received compromises by the West on suppressing the Syrian Kurdish. One of the major reasons of the regime change project in Syria was to eliminate the Kurdish.” Therefore, the party acted with suspicion towards all kind of change movement in Syria supported by Turkey. The Kurdish representatives within SNC, on the other hand, were described as “Kurdish collaborators”.[17]

In another interview the PYD leader Saleh Muslim gave to Firat News Agency, he expresses PYD's, and thus PKK's outlook on Syrian opposition and on Turkey's role with these statements: “The Syrian National Council (SNC) and Muslim Brotherhood organizations do not recognize the Kurds and their rights. And their policy on the Kurds are already defined by Turkey. We do not have any agreement with the Syrian administration. However, the state is aware of the fact that the Kurdish people are multi-organized. They know that all the Kurdish provinces in Syria would protest, if they had any armed initiative against us. Right now, we do not attack against the police stations. We are cautious as we are not directly attacked. Besides, we do not trust in Muslim Brothers conflicting with the regime either. We establish our assemblies for the time being. We have opened language schools all across the Kurdish provinces. Our de facto autonomy is in question. We have not resorted to armed struggle so far, but we cannot know what is ahead of us. If the circumstances change, the Syrian militants within PKK might begin a fight against Syria.[18] According to PYD, an agreement was made between the AK Party government and Syrian National Assembly, and in accordance with this agreement; Adana Agreement signed in 1998 would be maintained, and constitutional right would not be given to the Kurdish, after the breakdown of the Assad regime.[19] PYD warned the Kurdish representatives within the SNC to act in the light of this information. And in the statements of PKK, the organization put forth the fact that they have a distant approach towards the Syrian opposition and especially to the Muslim Brotherhood Movement, and that they stay away from them.[20]

Within this process, there were some information in the Turkish media putting forward that PKK was after establishing an “autonomous Kurdish Government” by taking advantage of the conflict in Syria. Within this framework, increasing the propaganda activities in regions close to the Turkey-Iraq borderline in order to establish unity among the tribes, PKK started to distribute weapons.[21] PYD, which is PKK's political wing in Syria, explicitly stated that their main objective is “Democratic Autonomy”.[22] Demands for autonomy could seem to contradict with the Syrian administration. However, if the Syrian administration overcame the current problematic process, it would think that it can easily suppress PYD's expectation for autonomy or all the other Kurdish demands. Thus, it also plays its Kurdish card against Turkey, and can spread the terror regarding that North Iraq-like formation could appear in the Syrian Kurdish region. What is more problematic for Turkey would be PKK-PYD, which is the most effective power of the possible North Iraq-like formation.

Rivalry Between North Iraq and PKK Over the Syrian Kurds

The first Kurdish party in Syria was established in 1957, under the name of “Kurdistan Democratic Party of Syria”. The party in the leadership of the Iraqi Kurdish leader Mustafa Barzani repeated the objectives of Iraqi KDP. Two years after Ba'ath's coming into power, in 1965, “Kurdish Democratic Progressive Party” was created. This party was in a close relation with PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) which was formed by the Iraqi Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani in 1975.[23] Therefore, it is possible to suggest that North Iraq has affected the Syrian Kurds throughout the history.

It is known that PKK also has a base among the Syrian Kurds. Cemil Bayık, one of the leaders of the organization, put forward the situation during one of his interviews as follows: “There is no doubt that there is a significant and organized Kurdish population under the influence of the Leader Apo, who worked in Syria for years. Of course, all the organizations in Syria do not have independent characteristics. Nevertheless, considering the significance of Leader Apo over the social base, it is possible to think that the Kurdish Freedom Movement's approaches and policies have a certain impact on Syria.[24] In the statement, the fact that the other Syrian Kurdish parties were described as “not independent” draws the attention.

Another conclusion reached while tracing back the approach between the Syrian regime and PKK is the fact that there is a rivalry between North Iraq and PKK to establish an influence over the Syrian Kurdish. The conflicts between these forces got more profound upon the civil unrest in Syria, and became visible. In the recent period, PYD has adopted a critical approach towards all initiatives developed in the leadership of KDP, and it has not taken part in these initiatives. From time to time, this situation causes to tension between the parties.

In late October 2011, 11 parties in Syria came together and established “Kurdistan National Assembly of Syria”. Established in Qamishli province, the Assembly suggested that, “The Kurdish problem should be solved within the framework of Syria's territorial integrity and that the rights of the Kurdish should be guaranteed.” This approach was different from PYD's expectations of “Democratic Autonomy”. PYD withdrew from the Kurdistan National Assembly of Syria by setting forth the representation problem. Kurdistan National Assembly of Syria organized a conference in Arbil with the participation of Massoud Barzani in late January 2012. And PKK's outlook on the aforesaid conference was harshly criticized by the statement of KCK Executive Council Presidency. KCK “argued for that the conference taking place in Arbil, encompassing only a certain group and not encompassing the majority of the people is such as to be a coup d'état against the unity of the Kurdish people, and that it is an initiative making the split more profound, and even that it is an initiative dynamiting the Kurdish union”.[25] PKK used these expressions for the “Kurdistan National Assembly of Syria”: “It is known that the majority of parties in the composition does not have a programme, charter and a cadre that is enough to form an assembly. More than half of these parties have not carried out a single congress up till now. They do not exist in Western Kurdistan.” PKK described the Conference as, “it is obvious that the main objective is to decrease the impact of PYD, around which masses were organized in Western Kurdistan, through a media study.” This outlook showed the rivalry between PKK and North Iraq on the Syrian Kurds.

The tension was carried further in short term and led to a direct polemics between Barzani and PKK. The Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq criticized PYD, which stated they were not invited to the “Congress of the Syrian Kurdish Diaspora Hawler” organized in Arbil. In the statement, also by using the name of MHP Chairman Devlet Bahçeli, it was indicated that PYD's announcement and messages remind us of the statements of Devlet Bahçeli, and the same style fed by anti-Kurdism is used as well as the same approach and the same mentality”. In the written statement made by the spokesman of the Kurdistan Regional Government Presidency, it was indicated that PYD had been invited to the congress, but that they changed their minds and decided not to participate in the congress in the last minute.[26] The aforesaid tension was clearly put forth through the statements of Hüseyin Koçer, who is the PYD Representative of Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq. Koçer argued for that “the Kurdish went through very critical times, and that the policy pursued by the Federal Kurdistan Regional Government for the Syrian Kurdish is not in favor of Kurds.[27]

PKK considered the Arbil-centered diplomatic traffic taking place before the conference as a signal of effort to breaking off their efficiencies over the Syrian Kurdish. Accordingly, “firstly the leader of the Syrian National Council (SNC) Burhan Galion and Commander of the Free Syrian Army Riad Assad, who took refuge in Turkey, talked. Then the Leader of the Lebanese Forces Samir Geagea paid a quiet visit to Arbil on January 12th. During this visit, a meeting was held among the Head of the Kurdish National Council of Syria Abdul Hakeem Bashar, Burhan Galion, Semir Geagea, and some Southern officials.” PKK interpreted this process as “the negotiation of how to share the policies in Syria, and what kind of supports could be received from the Kurdistan Government.” This traffic of negotiations was assessed as “imposing the strategy agreed by Turkey on Western Kurdistan.”[28] These aforesaid interpretations explicitly showed how the process was read and perceived as threat by PKK.

It was possible to see the signs of the rivalry between PKK and North Iraq on Syrian Kurds during the visit of journalist Çetiner Çetin along with the delegation of Felicity Party to Damascus in early January 2012. In the analysis based on the interviews carried out with Syrian officials, Çetin made an assessment regarding that, “Assad, who concerned about the fact that the Head of Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq Massoud Barzani did not accept his invitation to Damascus and about the talks between Barzani and the former Prime Minister of Lebanon Hariri, is planning to cooperate with PYD, which is political extension of PKK terrorist organization in Syria, against Barzani by thinking that Barzani could cooperate with the Kurds in northern Syria and that he could cause to revolt among the Kurdish here”. Çetin strived to reinforce his argument through development such as “Assad's forgiving Saleh Muslim, the PYD leader sentenced to lifetime imprisonment in the past months, his letting Muslim appear in meetings, and Muslim's praising the Assad regime to the Syrian Kurdish people and his saying that the people should support the regime”.[29]


Conclusion

The regression in Turkey-Syria relations started upon the spread of civil unrest into Syria on March 2011. However, Turkey's changing her incentive policy into the policy of pressure and isolation took place following the critical talk that Minister of Foreign Affairs Davutoğlu carried out with Syrian leader Bashar Assad in Damascus on August 2011. Even though Turkey had a critical approach towards Syria during the process before this development, she acted as a shield on West's outlook in favor of taking stronger and faster steps. Until this period, the tension only reflected on foreign policy discourses, but was not put into practice. In fact, Syrian party even gave two PKK terrorists to Turkey within July 2011 in order to decrease the pressure coming from Turkey and to show what the good relations with Syria meant.[30] Syria was trying to decrease Turkey's pressure through these steps and also to show what Turkey would deprived of in case the tension increased. Nevertheless, it is seen that the parties mutually put their pressure tools into practice upon the breaking off in relations.

The conclusion reached in this study is the fact that especially after September 2011, there has been an approach between the Syrian administration and PKK-PYD. The elements supporting this claim could be listed as follows: change in PKK and PYD discourses towards the Assad administration, PYD's finding room for maneuver in Syria again, and PYD's applying pressure on other Syrian Kurdish groups that are critical against the Assad regime. However, considering in terms of PKK and PYD, it is seen that there has been a tactical cooperation with the Assad regime. Above all, PKK was under the pressure of the Syrian administration as a result of the cooperation between Turkey and Syria in the fight against terror for the last 15 years upon the Adana Agreement. During this period, many PKK terrorists were given to Turkey. PKK leader group already explicitly state that they do not forget this period. In addition to this, PKK considers Assad regime's getting weaker in internal and foreign pressure environment as an opportunity both for itself and for the Syrian Kurds. As of now, the Syrian Kurds and PKK consider the uprising as a struggle among Arabs, and they try to take the maximum advantage by not involving much in this struggle. PKK pulls off compromises from the regime by preventing the Syrian Kurds from pouring into the streets in mass groups. The Kurds and PKK think that Arabs got weaker and split by conflicting among themselves. Despite being minority, the disunity in the country carries the Kurds into a critical position just like in the Iraqi politics. Both regime and opposition strive to take the Kurds on their own sides. And the Kurds strive to carry their gains to the top level in each scenario by developing relations with both sides. And in this equation, PKK appears as the actor staying close to the Syrian regime. However it is also seen that PKK does not argue for Assad regime's surviving no matter what. PKK can use the opportunity of breakdown of the Assad regime in case the organization secures is position among the Kurds by taking advantage of the current situation. The second leader of PKK, Murat Karayılan's statements on Roj TV put forward this approach. Accordingly, “Many regimes changed in Syria from 1945 to 1963, but the Kurdish could not somehow take advantage of that. Right now, a historical opportunity is in question. The Kurds can have their fundamental legal rights here, and can be recognized as a nation. Nevertheless, in order to do so, the Kurdish union, a Kurdish strategy should be established. The Kurds should not immediately take a side. They should develop self-defense instead of attack.” As clearly seen from these statements as well, although PKK and PYD have a tactical cooperation with the regime, they do all their plans depending on the post-Assad.

Considering in terms of the Syrian regime, PKK is considered as a tool to protect the regime both inside and outside. Syrian Kurds' uprising in a period when the unrest got more violent will turn the power balance in favor of the opponents in the country. How organized the Syrian Kurds are, and their potential of threatening the regime was clearly seen Kurdish unrests in 2004 and 2005. Above all, the administration prevents the Kurdish unrest by providing room for maneuver to PKK, which is effective on the Syrian Kurds. Besides, the administration also have chance to apply pressure on the groups between the Syrian Kurds and the opposition camps through PKK. The assassination of Meshal Temmo, who was within the Syrian opposition, could be given as an example. If the Syrian regime overcomes this problematic process, it would already think that it could pacify PKK again whenever it wants. However, it is not possible for the Syrian administration to support PKK as in 1980's and 1990's. Such an approach would provoke Turkey in such a period, when military intervention is talked and when expectations from Turkey to assume an active role on this issue are quite high, and it would also legitimize taking military measures. Syria only wants to give message via PKK, but for now, she does not take any step that would force red lines of Turkey.

Lastly, considering in terms of Turkey, it is possible that she supports the group taking the side of opposition in polarization among the Syrian Kurds and developing good relations with the administration of North Iraq. Although the Syrian Kurdish Conference, which was held in Arbil, disturbed some groups; it is necessary to see that, in fact, there are some opportunities. First of all, if a Kurdish political movement will be effective over the Syrian Kurds, North Iraq would be preferred rather than PKK. And secondly, Turkey, who argues for the regime change in Syria, would want to support the groups within the opposition camp. And this situation would be Syrian Kurdish movements, which are found within the SNC or which stand closer to the Syrian opponents.



References:

[1] Yusuf Ziyad, “PKK’nın manevra alanı genişledi”, Firat News Agency, 2 October 2011.

[2] “Maşaal Temo’ya suikastı kim düzenledi?”, Firat News Agency, 8 October 2011.

[3] “Şam Kürt Kartını Kullanabilir”, BBC Turkish, 30 September 2011.

[4] “PKK oyununa girmemelerini şiddetle tavsiye ederim”, Hürriyet, 9 November 2012.

[5] “Suriye’ye PKK yanıtı”, Hürriyet, 9 December 2011.

[6] “Erdoğan İran ve Suriye’ye gönderme yaptı”, Hürriyet, 20 October 2011.

[7] “Beyrut’ta PKK sesleri”, Hürriyet, 31 October 2011.

[8] Christophe Ayad, “PYD en organizeli ve en önemli parti”, Le Monde, 11 October 2011.

[9] “Kürt kartını açtı”, 9 November 2011.

[10] “PKK Suriye sınırında kamp kurdu, Milliyet, 23 November 2011.

[11] “Öcalan’ın villası için katliam”, Türkiye Gazetesi, 12 January 2012.

[12] “Kamışlı’daki Bedro suikastından PKK-Suriye ittifakı çıktı”, Zaman, 9 February 2012.

[13] "Esad’ın Türkiye’ye karşı silahı PKK", Hürriyet, 26 January 2012.

[14] “PKK Esad muhaliflerine saldırdı”, Milliyet, 6 February 2012.

[15] “Suriye fay hattı tüm bölge yanar”, Hürriyet, 31 October 2011.

[16] Cengiz Çandar, “Tuzağa düşmemek zamanı”, Radikal, 24 September 2011.,

[17] PYD Lideri Salih Müslim ile Röportaj, “Suriye’de Kürtler yol haritası çıkartıyor”, Firat News Agency, 12 September 2011.

[18] “Kürtler Arap muhalefetine nasıl bakıyor?”, Firat News Agency, 18 December 2011.

[19] “AKP ile Suriye muhalefeti arasında Kürt karşıtı anlaşma”, Firat News Agency, 13 October 2011.

[20] “Cemil Bayık’tan Türkiye’ye Suriye uyarısı”, Firat News Agency, 8 October 2011.

[21] “PKK’nın büyük Suriye oyunu ortaya çıktı”, Hürriyet, 10 September 2011.

[22] PYD Lideri Salih Müslim ile Röportaj, “Suriye’de Kürtler yol haritası çıkartıyor”, Firat News Agency, 12 September 2011.

[23] Sami Moubayed, “US Designs on Syria’s Kurds”, Asia Times, 9 April 2005.

[24] “Türkiye Suriye’de nüfus sahibi olamaz’”, Firat News Agency, 31 December 2011.

[25] “KCK: AKP, Hewler’e operasyon teklifleri götürüyor”, Firat News Agency, 30 January 2012.

[26] “Barzani ile PKK arasında ilginç atışma”, Milliyet, 2 February 2012.

[27] “PKK’nın katılmadığı bir konferans, ulusal olmaz”, Firat News Agency, 3 February 2012.

[28] “Kürt Hükümeti’nin Ankara ile Suriye planı”, Firat News Agency, 30 January 2012.

[29] Çetiner Çetin, “Şam’dan ‘Acem’ Oyunu: Ak Parti Hükümeti Dışardan Değil İçerden Durdurulmak İsteniyor”,
ORSAM Dış Politika Analizi, 9 January 2012, http://www.orsam.org.tr/tr/yazigoster.aspx?ID=3053.

[30] “Suriye, 2 teröristi teslim etti”, Yeni Şafak, 4 July 2011.