SYRIAN OPPONENTS - 4: AN INTERVIEW WITH SUNDA SULEIMAN, ONE OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SYRIAN ARAB ALAWITE SOCIETY

The Ba'ath regime in Syria is known as a minority power, based on Arab Alawites. Indeed, people in Head-of-State position, and in many key-role positions are Arab Alawite-origin. However, all of the Arab-Alawite society, who are estimated to compose approximately 10% of the Syrian population, do not support the Assad regime. The Arab Alawite representatives, who came from Hama, also took part in the Syrian opponents conference that was organized in Antalya. The opponent Arab Alawites claim that it is indeed the Assad regime itself, which gave damage to their societies the most. We carried out an interview with Sunda Suleiman, who is the member of the “Party of Modernity and Democracy for Syria” that was created in order to represent the Arab Alawites, on the general situation of the Syrian Arab Alawites, and on their point of view related to the civil commotion in Syria.

Can you introduce yourself ?

Sunda Suleiman: My name is Sunda Suleiman. I am from the suburbs of Hama where the Allawite population is the majority.

Are you from a tribe?

The Alawites don’t have tribes. They belong to the sect, the loyalty goes to the sect itself.
Here today are you presenting just yourself individuality or a political group?
I am a member of a party called Party of Modernity and Democracy for Syria. I am a political activist belonging to that party.

It is generally said especially in the West that the Syrian regime is an Alawite regime. But here many said that while the people around Basher Assad are Alawite, the whole Allawite population does not support the regime. In this respect is it possible to call Syrian regime as Allawite regime?

Firstly it is not possible to describe the regime as an Alawite regime. That is because even in the days of Hafez al-Assad, the father of Basher Assad, many of the opposition figures, who belonged to the same sect, were the Alawites; they were arrested, imprisoned, and tortured just like the other oppositions. Second is that many of the Alawite figures are not supporting the regime. The regime has always played the card of the Alawites, assuming that all the Alawites are loyal to him, therefore loyal to the regime. What happens in reality is that this is not true, because during Basher Assad and his father rule, being an Alawite become harmful to Alawites, a corrupt regime created such kind of a perception. It must be noted that they are loyal to their sect; however their loyalty to their nation, to their Watan is more important for them.

Are there any fears within the Alawite community in Syria that if the regime collapses, that will lead maybe not a civil war, but being a minority in a Sunna majority society. In other words are there any fears of sectarian conflict?

It is very important to know that the Alawites are not the only minority in Syria. In Syria there is the Alawites, Ismailites, Shias, Christians, and Druzes. So, all these elements of the Syrian society constitute the nation of Syria. The regime has played, since its start this card, trying to divide them, trying to make everyone fear from each other. The regime is threatening everybody with the Sunna, which means that there is a trap. Since the beginning of the regime, they started telling, provoking and saying that. They go to the Alawites and say “if you are not loyal to me the Sunna will banish you”. Unfortunately, what is happening is that the Christians, Alawites and other minority groups in Syria were falling in this trap. They were thinking that the regime was protecting them. This was what they were advocating by saying that “those people are going to attack you”. They are doing even more than that. They are giving weapons to Alawites and were asking them who we are calling “thugs”, not only Alawites, “criminals.” Regime gives weapons to people from different sects, also Alawites to attack on Sunnis. Both Sunnis and Alawites are falling in this trap. Our role here is to promote awareness among the people; telling them this is the biggest trap. Big evidence is that we are here altogether, agreeing on everything. We all want Syria liberated and democratic.

Could you tell us how you joined this conference?

First of all I am invited by several opposition groups that are part of the organizing party of this conference. Secondly, we today asked every participant –I did this personally- to provide suggestions to be included within the last statement that is going to be the result and outcome of this conference. Each person presented a few suggestions. One of my suggestions which are representing the party, was that there should be a bullet point saying that the Syrian Revolution will engulf, will contain all people and all sects. We have one target, which is to overthrow this regime. The other suggestion is going to be that we need to reassure as supporters of the Syrian Revolution that we are going to reassure minorities, specifically the Alawite minority to show them that this revolution is not by any mean or form targeting Alawites after the overthrow of the regime. We are committed to this.

What are you ideas about Turkey’s role in this process? What are your expectations from Turkey?

Turkey, as government and people, has presented many good steps to promote what’s happening in Syria. The problem is that very strong ties between the Syrian regime and Turkish government had made it very difficult to disentangle from this relation. However, the steps that has been taken so far by trying to promote reforms, stop the bloodshed, many demands presented by Davutoglu, Gül, and Erdogan, in total were very promising. But we have high hopes and high expectations from the Turkish people, specifically, to actually demand more severe and stern stand from what the government has done, because they have an elected government. The elected government represents the people; therefore they can push further into stopping the bloodshed in Syria.

It is noted that the Alawites in Banias and Lazkiya are different. What are the differences within the Alawite people? Which one is against the regime?

As you said Alawites are spread in many cities and villages in Syria. The first demonstration that happened in Damascus was recorded by a young man who was Alawite. There are many discrepancies like Alawites and like the others. People from Damascus are divided. Some of them are loyalists, others are from the opposition. So we cannot narrow it down to Alawites. We don’t even say “this is Alawite, this is Sunna”. This is not a taboo, but we don’t divide people according to their sect. Furthermore, the Alawites living in coastal region might have had, during the regime’s reign, more advantages than others within the internal regions in Syria like Hama for instance. So they were not privileged as the ones in the coastal areas. That’s the answer in general. The main difference is those who are opposing and those who are promoting.

Thank you very much.

* This interview was carried out during the “Change in Syria Conference”, which was organized in Antalya, on June 1st 2011, by Prof. Dr. Veysel Ayhan, ORSAM Middle East Advisor; and Oytun Orhan, ORSAM Middle East Expert.

SYRIAN OPPONENTS - 3: AN INTERVIEW WITH SYRIAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYER AND ACTIVIST YASER TABBARA

In addition to the participants from Syria in the “Change in Syria Conference”, organized in Antalya; opponents, most of whom have to live in Europe, in the U.S., and in Arab countries, participated in the conference as well. We talked to the Syrian activist Yaser Tabbara, who lives in the U.S., who is the member of the human rights organization called “CAIR-Chicago”, an also who is working as an human rights lawyer in his own office in the U.S., on the Conference and the future of Syria, in Antalya. Although the activities of the activists, who live in the U.S. and in Europe, are limited in Syria, they assume a major role in grabbing the attention of the world public opinion towards Syria, and in providing an international pressure on the Assad regime.

Could you introduce yourself ?

Yasser Tabara: My name is Yasser Tabara. I’m a Syrian American attorney. I’ve been practicing law for almost ten years in Chicago. I was born in Chicago, raised in Damascus and then went back to the United States. I studies Political Science and my focus was International Human Rights and Civil Rights Law. I established is a civil rights organization for the defense of the rights of Arabs and Muslims live in the United States in Chicago. Right now I have a law office.

What is your position in the opposition who is gathering here today?

I don’t think it is accurate to call it an opposition gathering, in fact I think what this gathering has proven to the entire world that the position of the Syrian regime and the criminality of the regime is a mainstream position. It is no more a marginal opposition. You know, the Syrian opposition has always been described as disorganized, fragmented, basically weak and non-existent in Syria. Whether it is true or not, it is not what I’m going to get into. My point is that the perception of the opposition by the outside world reflected on the anti-regime position. That’s not true, because there are many free-thinking Syrians that were independent and did not belong to a political group and did not have a political agenda. Basically, those people came together from all over the world to send a very strong message that “We are in support of the Syrian Revolution”. This is something that this conference accomplished.

The committee which is planning to be established will have division among the opposition groups, and some of them are Muslim Brotherhood and Kurds. What do you think about that?

Think that’s another misperception or misconception about this conference. I think this conference is in no way intending to form a transitional council like the one we saw in Libya. This conference specifically is to do one thing only and that is basically support the Syrian Revolution inside the practical and pragmatic steps. And this step is to create a coordinating council; a committee, not even a council. That is basically to bring the Syrian activists from all over the world. There have been a lot of efforts that take place by Syrians in the US, Europe, in Arab countries, all over the world. But these efforts have not been coordinated very well. This conference is attempting to achieve coordination and synchronicity between all these activists, so they maximize the effect of their work. So the results out of this conference is to ensure the continuity of the work of this coordination, we need some sort of a coordinating body. That coordinating body is going to be a committee which is to be elected. There are a number of ways for us to pick that committee and the most popular way that people have agreed upon is to elect. Obviously through voting, you want to ensure that everybody is represented, classic opposition figures, the Muslim Brotherhood, or the Kurds, etc. So that it could be a truly representative committee.

How do you find the conference? Can you find a common ground between different opposition groups?

When I first came to this conference, I had very low expectations. I think I was very pleasantly surprised for a number of reasons. One was to see that amount of division, this sort of perceived problems, visions, predicted that this is going to fail because people were shouting marches and all that stuff. That actually did not take place. It’s been surprisingly civilized and productive. Yes, there are egos, there are people who are classic leaders and do not like to work with others but that has been overshadowed, in my opinion, by the presence of the youth, who is here without an agenda, with only one idea in mind that is to work. There is a lot of youth that you might have observed that is here to do exactly that. The other thing that is happening is to establish a number of workshops, committees to basically discuss ways to coordinate, for example the legal coordination agenda, the preservation of evidence, so that we could put together legal cases. Other areas of media activism, organizing protests basically comes out fully coordinated to bring together tens of thousands, hopefully hundreds of thousands Syrians together across the world at the same time in support of the Syrian Revolution. So a lot of these action items are being produced. That is the second thing that is pleasantly surprising to me as well.

I experienced another conference in another Arab country and when I attend that conference, I can feel that they want revolution. They come together and work. But in this conference, they are trying but they are different. Now I can’t really feel they want to do something together towards revolution. Maybe this is the first time they come together to talk something. But I don’t feel that they want revolution. I joined the Druze meeting in Lebanon, I felt that everybody is thinking the same thing.

This is the first time in the modern history of Syria that you have people from many different backgrounds. Syria is an extremely rich mosaic of religions, ethnic backgrounds, political ideologies, and it has always been said that those who basically stock the fear of sectarianism talk about that the alternative to Basher Assad’s regime is terrible or bleak, we don’t have any future, and we don’t have any hope. But this conference has demonstrated that despite all of these differences we still come together, we still meet we still put together, we are doing our workshops, and we are working towards common action. I would encourage you to attend some of the workshops that take place today. I think what you have observed is the political side of this conference. Any political process is an adversarial process. This group has a particular agenda that it seeks to pass, that group is represented heavily than that, you see the give-and-take. My view is that is a healthy demonstration. The Syrians are meeting for the first time in many years in a democratic process. Of course you are going to see some give-and-take, some conflicts, but nothing is basically developing into disastrous situations. We haven’t seen a disaster. We haven’t seen someone leaving the conference and saying “this is not what I hoped”. We haven’t seen that. And honestly I expected that. I’m very happy and I’m keeping my fingers crossed.

Do you want to give some message to Turkish government and people?

My first and foremost message is that I think everyone in this conference will be repeating the same exact message. Everyone is extremely grateful to the Turkish people for hosting us, for taking us in, for understanding our plight, for supporting our cause and for opening their country to us like this. This is highly politicized situation; we understand that this is not a very pleasant and easy situation for Turkish people and government. We completely appreciate that. Some people were worried yesterday at dinner that somebody announced the Syrian regime announced amnesty to all political prisoners and the immediate reaction was a demonstration. The demonstration basically said that it was too little and too late. At the end of the demonstration, the protesters made a point “Shukran, shukran Turkiyya”. Everybody was saying it in one voice. That truly reflected the sentiment of the people here. Now on a political level, we would like Turkish government to take even a harsher stance on Basher Assad’s government. We told them what you have done so far is amazing, but you need to take a step further. That step is to call the Assad regime unequivocally an illegitimate leader of Syria to ask the Assad regime to step down and to give weight to democratic process.

Thank you very much.


* This interview was carried out during the “Change in Syria Conference”, which was organized in Antalya, on June 1st 2011, by Prof. Dr. Veysel Ayhan, ORSAM Middle East Advisor; and Oytun Orhan, ORSAM Middle East Expert.

SYRIAN OPPONENTS - 2: AN INTERVIEW WITH ANAS ABDULLAH, THE HEAD OF THE DAMASCUS DECLARATION AND THE LEADER OF THE SYRIAN JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT MOVEM

The Damascus declaration, which was signed in 2005, was put into practice in order to gather the disorganized Syrian opposition. Different opposition groups, composed of liberals, Arab tribes, businessmen, the Kurds and the non-governmental organizations, signed the Declaration. The Syrian regime arrested many people after the publication of the declaration, and as a result the signatories had to carry out their activities out of Syria. One of the participants of the Syrian opponents conference in Antalya was the Damascus Declaration group, and four seats were reserved for the group in the Committee that was created. We made an interview with Anas Abdullah, who is the Head of the Group, who assumed role in the organization of the Antalya conference, and at the same time who is the Leader of the Syrian Justice and Development Movement that he created as a result of his inspiration by the AK Party (Justice and Development Party) in Turkey, on the future of the opposition social movements in Syria, the consequences of the Antalya conference, and their expectations from Turkey.

What are the differences between the Ikhwan and the other parties?

There was no difference; it is only basic exchange of opinions. They were talking about the final communiqué. Some people gave some suggestions for some proposed point for the final communiqué. One of the proposals was that the future of Syria should be secular. Some people point that this proposal is already a part of the communiqué. They replied by saying it should not be secular, and argued that Islam should play an important role. We tried to explain that these are only suggestions. We have a committee that would work on the final communiqué and most probably it would not talk about this sensitive issue. We leave it to the Syrian people to decide within the context of what we are calling is a democratic and civilian state governed and controlled by civilians. Then it is up to the Syrian people to decide exactly the nature of their constitution, the role of Islam and other religions in their life. Some people thought that these suggestions are already a part of it, but it is not.

Some criticize about the election of the committee. You say that the committee was elected by people while other parties objected and said no, they give seats for the divan. Could you explain the exact problem?

In order to elect a committee of thirty one people, we decided that it should be elected according to the lists. Whoever wants to propose a list, can propose a thirty one people list and people will be able to elect which list they want, this way. We will be able to have as many representations as possible. If we go for a direct election we might miss some important elements of the national spectrum. That is because, you know, we don’t have many Christians, Alawites, Druze. If you go for direct elections, you might miss important elements of the Syrian society. This is why we suggest a proposal list of names.

What if you don’t satisfy with your demands is there any possibility that you withdraw from the conference?

There is no withdrawal. People will talk and agree. There will be a consensus. This is a normal way. This is the first time for the Syrian people to talk.

What is Ikhwan’s approach regarding an Islamic state?

I’m not from Ikhwan by the way. Ikhwan has moved very progressively on this, and they are calling for a civilian state, which is not controlled by any specific religion.

Was it your choice or did Turkey encourage you to have this conference here?

First of all, we feel very grateful to the Turkish people and the Turkish state. It is because of this rather progressive experiment of freedom and democracy in Turkey, we are able to have this conference here. We did not have to ask for permission for this conference. We could have this conference in any of the European countries. Because we have the same standard here, it makes more sense to have it in Turkey. We have a historical relationship.

It was our choice. Firstly, that is because it is a neighboring country. Secondly, I can say that there are certain affiliations with Turkey. Turkey represents something positive. Especially in the last ten years, the success of the experiment of the Justice and Development Party inspired us; even I with my colleagues start a movement for justice and development, which is inspired by your model. Almost everybody in Syria looks to Turkey with anticipation. This helps us a lot. When we have a conference in Turkey, everybody tends to be friendly. We are not going to any other country that has a problem with Syria. It is a neighboring country. Antalya, in the southern part, is very close to our homeland. It really makes much more sense.

Can you see any possibility that Turkey can do more to support the opposition?

I think the Turkish people need to realize that the real interests of Turkey would be served more with a democratic Syria than an autocratic Syria. Basher Assad is not good news for Turkey. In the past, Turkish establishment invested in Basher’s regime both politically and financially.

Which period do you mean?

During the JDP government, Turkey invested in Basher and his regime. That’s why Erdogan and his colleagues are very nervous now. Because, with that kind of investment you expect some paybacks, Erdogan tried his best to warn Basher, even before the start of the revolution. Assad said “No, we are immune”. Erdogan was right, Basher was wrong; revolution started. Erdogan made really important comments in support of the Syrian people. However, by saying that I think Turkey should take slightly more assertive measures for supporting the opposition, because a democratic Syria is a strategic interest to Turkey. I know Turkey is not happy for the reason that Basher represents some kind of instability in the region. We know instability is bad for Turkey. This is why we want a peaceful transition of power if possible. If not, then I’m sure we will need the help and backing of Turkey during the transition period both in terms of providing help and support but also in terms of providing knowledge regarding constitution, new laws, labor laws, association laws. I hope very soon we will start to import Turkish experiment and implement in Syria. I hope the Movement of Justice and Development will be spearheading that.

* This interview was carried out during the “Change in Syria Conference”, which was organized in Antalya, on June 2nd 2011, by Prof. Dr. Veysel Ayhan, ORSAM Middle East Advisor; and Oytun Orhan, ORSAM Middle East Expert.

SYRIAN OPPONENTS - 1: AN INTERVIEW WITH RADWAN ZIADEH, THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE SYRIAN CENTER FOR POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC STUDIES

Ziadeh, who edited books entitled “The Struggle for Reform in Syria”, and “The Reform in Syria: between Domestic and international politics”, is one of the most popular figures of the Syrian opposition movement. Living in the U.S., Ziadeh is the Executive Director of the “Syrian Center for Political and Strategic Studies”, and at the same time he has lectured at George Washington University. We carried out an interview with Ziadeh, who has been conducting studies on Syria in the U.S. non-governmental organizations and research centers, on the future of Syria.

Could you introduce yourself briefly ?

Radwan Ziya: My name is Radwan Ziya. I’m the executive director of the Syrian Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Washington DC. I’m also a scholar at George Washington University.What were your expectations before this meeting and now for you what are the results? Are you satisfied with the meeting? Are you much more enthusiastic about the uprising now?We have been waiting for this momentum for quite a long time. People became engaged with politics after what has happened in Tunisia and Egypt. It was a matter of time for us before the uprising in Syria started in March 15. From March 15 until now, we see how much change occurred in Syria and regional countries. Now actually the people in Syria discovered their voice, their power and will, and I’m sure that they will not accept anything less than Egyptian and Tunisian achievement.

What are your perceptions on future of Syria if the regime collapses? A democracy transition or other options?

Christian and Muslim people have lived together for quite a long time. In 1860, when the civil war started, the Muslim people protected the Christians in Damascus. In 1954 the Prime Minister was a Christian. The majority of the Christians are Orthodox. This gives you an idea that there is no such kind of history of sectarian conflict in the Syrian society and will not be in the future for sure. One of the benefits of the Syria Revolution is having one united voice. The Syrian people are one. And this gives you the idea that there will be a prospect of democracy and prosperity. It’s not an easy task, of course, after 47 years of authoritarian regime. There are a lot of challenges in the politics, in the economy, and in the regional context. But, I think with such a human resource and people, I’m very positive that we will come up with democracy. Syria was always in Freedom House reports or in some other reports as one of the worst countries. We need to get out of this list. The Syria in the 1950s has been an avant-garde in progress of the region. Now it has to return back to its own history.

You are talking about the International Criminal Court. Do you connect with the European countries regarding their possible initiatives in the context of for example the International Criminal Court?

We have already made three attempts for this. The UN Human Rights Council in Geneva, which actually adapted resolution in April 29, will dispatch a mission to investigate all the human rights breaches in Syria. It will work with the Security Council to adopt resolution to further the case in the International Criminal Court. This is the only way to go to the International Criminal Court. It is very important because we believed the opposition is so strong to change the Syrian regime.
Yes, the protesters on the ground have gained the momentum. On April 22, we talked about 84 demonstrations in different cities and towns in Syria. On last Friday, there were 52 demonstrations in different cities in Syria. This gives you an idea that protesters gained the momentum contrary to what the regime claims. The Washington Post and the New York Times claim that they have the upper hand now. Now the people are more engaged in the protests. A thirteen year-old boy have been killed in torture. That galvanized the protests. The reason behind those photos is to send a message to the people that do not join the protests. People are more interested to join the protests.

The regime is suppressing the protesters very harshly. At that point, it is differentiated from Egypt and Tunisia, the security apparatus is standing with the regime. What is your scenario on how the Assad regime will be toppled?

Even that the Syrian army do not give any signal that they will join the protests; at least they don’t have other options. Otherwise, it will open the country to international intervention, because the protests and killings will continue. Nobody can be silent on that. The Security Council will take some actions this week or the next week. This will open up for international intervention, unless the army takes some steps to enforce Basher Assad to step down.
When we look at the history of Syria; when Syria invaded Lebanon, they supported Christian groups. Why and how will they change their mind and start to support the demonstrations? We have now a different situation which is a non-violent. This is quite difficult for the army to argue that “we have to crush them”. It is only peaceful. At the same time, there is a lot of change in the region. This is why the regime has to understand that the change has come to Syria. They need to make important changes. Otherwise, the situation will continue. And it will open up to international intervention. We don’t live in slavery ages. We have to be free.

As a general observation, the oppositions groups in Antalya do not come from inside of Syria. Mainly they are from outside. You say tomorrow you will create a committee. At that point how will that committee create a link between the inside and outside of Syria?

Those people are actually coming from inside. The leaders of some opposition groups are hiding in different cities. It’s a quite difficult situation for any opposition inside Syria to come here. We don’t take any steps regarding this meeting without communicating with them. We are working together. The only thing we can do as Syrians outside is to support the people inside the country. Those who are inside are going to make the revolution and change the country. Those people will make us free. I never met my mother since 2007. The Syrian government banned my mother, my sisters, my brothers, my brothers-in-law to leave the country. My sister is in Syria and her husband is in Saudi Arabia. Now it has been three years; they haven’t met each other. That is only because she is my sister. It has to stop. Such kind of tactics has been used by security. It has to end. This is why the people started the revolution. The reason is the brutality of the Syrian regime regarding the school children. This is the spark of the revolution. Today, the case of Hamza al-Khateeb galvanized the protests more.

My last question is about your ideas bout Turkey’s position. What are your expections from Turkey? Also does Turkey has any influence over the opposition groups?

I wrote a brief policy, which I recommend you to read, published by the Project on Middle East Democracy. This is actually circulating in the conference. One of the recommendations for the US Administration and the EU that they should engage Turkey, because Turkey has leverage on Basher Assad and the Syrian people. We are very thankful to Turkey for this conference. At the same time Turkey has been seen as a leading country in the region. There is much appreciation after the comments of Erdogan. That’s why we need Turkey to support the protesters, the right side of the history. Syria has to be free and not go back to the slavery age. This is why Turkey and other countries have to work on that. They have to help us to achieve our freedom. We don’t need to have bloodshed in Syria and more murders in Syria. This is why more actions by the Turkish government will help us.

In this respect, what kinds of steps can be taken according to you?

First is mobilizing the International Islamic Organization. This is really important. This organization has to take some steps in condemning the violence and playing its role to stop such kind of killings in Syria. At the same time, Turkey has to engage with the opposition. They have to meet with the opposition leaders. They have to work regarding a timetable plan, regarding a transition period. I mean the Syrian regime will end. It’s a matter of months. This is why it is important for the Turkish government to engage with the Syrian people rather than the regime.

General acceptance is that the Allawis supported the regime. If the regime will collapse, how will you deal with the Allawi or the Druze population in Syria?

You know the Christians in Syria are different from the Christians in Egypt. The Christians in Syria are middle and upper class. They have the business community; they are very rich in Damascus and Aleppo. This is why it is difficult to exclude them from political process. This is not the case in Egypt also. This is why there is no concern of fear regarding the Christians. But otherwise, we actually initiated a National Initiative for Change last month, which called the Ministry of Defense and the Chief of the Army to support the protests and enforce Basher Assad to step down. The Minister of Defense is Allawi and this gives the Allawi people guarantee. An important figure from the Allawi community will be a leading figure in the transition period. This was the idea and we still believe that we should be pushing for that. The Druze is already with us and some Allawit are with us too. There are a lot of Allawi who is saying right now that the regime is taking the Allawi community as hostage.

* This interview was carried out during the “Change in Syria Conference”, which was organized in Antalya, on June 1st 2011, by Prof. Dr. Veysel Ayhan, ORSAM Middle East Advisor; and Oytun Orhan, ORSAM Middle East Expert.

Turkey – Iran Rivalry Over Syria

The on-going opposition public protests in Syria are watched by the neighbouring countries and the West closely. However, a possible change in Syria will probably affect Turkey and Iran the most. Both countries, which can be argued to be having the most influence on Syria, are trying to have the developments become in their benefit. Although Turkey and Iran have common concerns over “instability and Kurdish problem” regarding the protests in Syria, it can be seen that both have different positions. This situation is also reflected in the foreign policy statements of both countries.

It can be argued that Turkey is facing a dilemma with respect to the incidents in Syria. Turkey has improved her relations with Syria incrementally since 1998. During the period in which Syria was excluded from the international community owing to the 2003 Iraqi War and then assassination of Rafic Hariri, Turkey has continuously supported the authority of al-Assad. Syria, after this period, was able to abolish the international isolation mostly thanks to Turkey. Despite the pressures on Syria by the West, Turkey has demonstrated that she trusts Bashar al-Assad in making reforms. For that sake, “under the leadership of Bashar al-Assad, the Syrian project that realizes reforms in the country and cooperates with the West partially out of the county and diverges from Iran continuously” has been supported by Turkey. According to this view, any pressing and isolationist policies realized on Syria will not produce results. Scenarios about a regime change will generate new instabilities like in Iraq. Therefore, during the process which requires the long run, making “reform rather than revolution” is the most appropriate option. Hence, the supported idea is that “rather than the violence-favouring figures which support Iran within the regime, Turkey-supporting and change-favouring Bashar al-Assad should be supported, even if partially. This policy maintained for a long while successfully and generated some results. The relations between the USA and Syria have considerably improved, the Association Agreement between Syria and the EU was realized and tension with countries such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan came to an end. Syria, with the inspiration of Turkey as well, depicted a picture in which she contributed to stability in Lebanon. The period, which is believed to support the diversion of Syria from Iran, has also been supported by the West. However, with the spread of public protests commenced in the Middle East, in general, to Syria, Turkey’s Syria policy and her support to Bashar al-Assad started to be questioned. Because, according to Turkey, Bashar al-Assad is a “leader that can make reforms considering the demands of his public.” But although al-Assad authority took some steps such as the abolition of the state of emergency, he opted to harshly supress the public protests through the involvement of the army. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu expressed his disappointment in his interview with Aslı Aydıntaşbaş from Milliyet Newspaper. Davutoğlu expressed that “Bashar al-Assad has not said no to reforms but he thinks that he could extend it over time. However, he got late to do some things in time. Now, some things have lost their meanings. Now we want urgent developments in Syria.” Aslı Aydıntaşbaş expressed her impression from the interview that “Turkey has decreased her expectations about Bashar al-Assad in making the right moves considerably”

The most important reason about Turkey’s disappointment is that “Syria is listening to Iran, rather than Turkey”. Iran perceives the developments in Syria as vital threats. Because, a possible regime change will threaten Iran’s alliance with Syria, and change the balance of power with Israel not in favour of herself. In case of a regime change in Syria, being one of the possible authority alternates, Mohammed Taifur, the Secretary General of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, declared in an interview that “We do not take the Iran model into consideration at all. For us and other Arab countries, Turkey is the model. As in Turkey, we want transparent elections. Turkey model is the most suitable for us”, which shows that Iranian concerns have a concrete basis. Thus, it is seen that Iran supports the Baath regime without any condition. Iranian officials evaluate the protests as “the conspiracy of the West, USA and the Zinonists”. Hence, Syrian authorities do not trust any actors, including Turkey, as much as they trust Iran.

The primary concern of the Syria-like authoritarian regimes is “regime security”. When this is under threat, all other subjects lose their vitality. From the perspective of Iran as well, public protests should be supressed under any conditions. The US Department of State posited that “with regard to suppression of protests in Syria by Iran, they have trustworthy intelligence that Iranians help Syrian security forces”. Syrian regime, by its nature, focused on suppressing the public protests without considering reform pressures within the current atmosphere. This brings about questioning Turkey-Syria relations. Here, one can argue that both Turkey and Syria got mutually disappointed. Expecting unconditional support, Syria probably observed the statements of the Prime Minister, Erdogan, saying that “we do not want new Hama and Humus”. Similarly, Turkey gets uncomfortable with Bashar al-Assad acting in unison with Iran without considering any suggestions of Turkey.

Turkey has not found the expected reaction from the Bashar al-Assad regime, which she has supported against the West using her credibility. This has left Turkey within difficult position against the West, and it will prevent the relations with Syria to be in the same way from now on. The costs of being in the same picture with Syria will increase more. Even though there is disappointment within Syria, in the medium-term she will need Turkey again. Because, Iran, which has been trusted by Syria unconditionally, will act no role in recovering the international isolation that Syria will be having after all of the developments. At this point, it seems very difficult for Turkey to help Syria as she did in 2003 and 2005. All these possibilities will be realized when the regime is preserved with the suppression of all the public protests.

The matter that has been neglected in Turkey in the last decade and recent developments is to answer to the question whether “Syrian regime can make reforms”. There may be some mistakes made in understanding the nature of Syrian regime, the analysis of stance of Bashar al-Assad within the regime. It has been seen that change-favouring group within regime is not as powerful as the one that is against change. The way Syria supresses the public protests has also weakened the perception of “violence-favouring mighty figures within the regime against reformist Bashar al-Assad”. It is also seen that when it comes to regime security, all the groups do not get diverged that much. Violence-favouring figures such as Maher al-Assad, Rami Maalouf who are close to Iran depend on the political and military support from Iran, rather than considering the reform pressures. Even though Turkey got close relations with Syria in the last decade, the alliance between Iran and Syria had gotten its roots in the early 1980s. On the matter of security, close cooperation is maintained. Ideological convergence between Arab Alawite Syrian elites and Shia Iran should also be added to these factors.

Within the context Syria, another aspect that leaves Turkey in a difficult position is to question the general Middle East politics. Turkey, in the last years, has put the principles of “legitimacy” and “standing by the oppressed” into the basis of the Middle East policy. For that sake, she criticized the attacks of Israel to civilians in Gaza harshly, and regarding Egypt a speech was given about the need “to consider the demands of the public”. One of the important reasons for the increased Turkish influence in the Middle East region is the popularity gained within the public. It is also seen that the protestors in Syria expect support from Turkey. However, Turkey acts timidly in criticizing the al-Assad authority because of some reasons such as having close relations with Syria and the potential of a change in having negative ramifications on Turkey. This creates a problem of legitimacy by creating a dilemma between Turkey’s support of change rather than status quo and standing by the public against the regimes. Waving the Turkish flag for so many years, the Libyan public, for the first time, attacked the Turkish Consulate. The same threat is also applicable for the Syrian opposition public who argue to trust Turkey.

Suriye Üzerinde Türkiye – İran Rekabeti

Suriye’de devam eden muhalif halk hareketleri tüm bölge ülkeleri ve Batı tarafından yakından takip edilmektedir. Ancak Suriye’deki olası değişim muhtemelen en çok Türkiye ve İran’ı etkileyecektir. Suriye üzerinde en fazla etkinliğe sahip olduğunu söyleyebileceğimiz iki ülke, gelişmeleri kendi lehlerine yönlendirme çabası içindedir. Türkiye ve İran’ın, Suriye’deki isyana ilişkin “istikrarsızlık ve Kürt meselesi” gibi ortak güvenlik kaygıları olsa da farklı pozisyonlara sahip olduğu görülmektedir. Bu durum iki ülkenin dış politika söylemlerine de yansımaktadır.

Türkiye’nin Suriye’deki olaylara ilişkin bir ikilem içinde olduğu söylenebilir. Türkiye 1998’den itibaren kademeli olarak Suriye ile ilişkilerini geliştirmiştir. 2003 Irak Savaşı ve ardından 2005 Refik Hariri suikastı sebebiyle Suriye’nin uluslararası toplumdan dışlandığı dönemde Türkiye sürekli olarak Esad yönetimine destek vermiştir. Suriye daha sonraki dönemde büyük ölçüde Türkiye sayesinde uluslararası izolasyonu kırmayı başarmıştır. Türkiye, Batı’nın Suriye üzerindeki baskılarına karşın Beşar Esad’a reform yapabileceği konusunda güvendiğini göstermiştir. Bu anlamda “Beşar Esad liderliğinde içte reform ve dışarıda Batı ile kısmi işbirliği yapan ve giderek İran’dan uzaklaşan Suriye projesi” Türkiye tarafından desteklenmiştir. Bu düşünceye göre Suriye üzerinde uygulanacak baskı ve izolasyon politikaları sonuç üretmeyecektir. Rejim değişikliği senaryoları Irak benzeri yeni istikrarsızlıklar doğuracaktır. Dolayısıyla uzun vadeye yayılan bir süreçte “devrim yerine reform”un hayata geçirilmesi en uygun seçenektir. Bu nedenle “rejim içinde İran’a yakın olan sertlik yanlısı isimlerin aksine sınırlı da olsa değişimi savunan Türkiye yanlısı Beşar Esad desteklenmeli” düşüncesi savunulmuştur. Bu politika uzun süre başarılı bir şekilde yürümüş ve sonuç da üretmiştir. Suriye ve ABD ilişkileri nispeten düzelmiş, Suriye ve AB arasında Ortaklık Anlaşması hayata geçirilmiş ve Suudi Arabistan, Ürdün gibi ülkelerle olan gerginlik sona ermiştir. Suriye, Lübnan’da, Türkiye’nin de telkinleriyle istikrara katkı sunan bir profil çizmiştir. Suriye’nin İran’dan uzaklaşmasını sağladığına inanılan bu süreç Batı tarafından da desteklenmiştir. Ancak Ortadoğu genelinde yaşanan halk hareketlerinin Suriye’ye sıçraması ile Türkiye’nin Suriye politikası ve Beşar Esad’a verdiği destek sorgulanmaya başlamıştır. Zira Türkiye’ye göre Beşar Esad “halkının taleplerini dikkate alarak reform yapabilecek bir liderdir.” Ancak Esad yönetimi, olağanüstü hal uygulamasının kaldırılması gibi bazı adımlar atmış olsa da halk hareketlerini orduyu devreye sokarak sert bir şekilde bastırma yolunu seçmiştir. Dışişleri Bakanı Ahmet Davutoğlu Türkiye’nin duyduğu hayal kırıklığını Milliyet Gazetesi’nden Aslı Aydıntaşbaş’a verdiği mülakatta dile getirmiştir. Davutoğlu “Beşar Esad reforma hayır demiş değil ama zamana yayabileceğini düşünüyor. Fakat zamanında bazı şeyleri yapmakta geç kaldı. Şimdi artık bazı şeyler anlamını yitirdi. Artık Suriye’de şok gelişme istiyoruz” sözleri ile ifade etmiştir. Aslı Aydıntaşbaş sohbetten “Türkiye’nin Beşar Esad’ın doğru hamleleri yapacağına yönelik beklentisini iyice düşürdüğü” izlenimini edindiğini belirtmiştir.

Türkiye’yi hayal kırıklığına iten en önemli neden “Suriye’nin Türkiye’den ziyade İran’ın sözünü dinliyor olmasıdır.” İran, Suriye’deki gelişmeleri yaşamsal tehdit olarak algılamaktadır. Zira olası bir rejim değişikliği Suriye ile ittifakını riske sokarak İsrail ile güç dengelerini kendi aleyhine değiştirecektir. Suriye’de bir rejim değişikliği durumunda olası iktidar alternatiflerinden Suriye Müslüman Kardeşler örgütü Genel Sekreteri Muhammed Tayfur’un bir röportajında kullandığı “İran modelini hiçbir şekilde dikkate almıyoruz. Biz ve diğer Arap ülkeleri için Türkiye modeldir. Türkiye’de olduğu gibi şeffaf seçimler istiyoruz. Türkiye modeli bizim için en uygun olanıdır” ifadeleri İran’ın kaygısının somut temellere dayandığını göstermektedir. Bu nedenle İran’ın koşulsuz olarak Baas rejiminin yanında olduğu görülmektedir. İranlı yetkililer protesto gösterilerini “Batı, ABD ve Siyonist komplosu” olarak değerlendirmektedir. Dolayısıyla Suriye yönetimi şu aşamada Türkiye dahil hiçbir aktöre İran’a olduğu kadar güvenmemektedir.

Suriye tarzı otoriter yönetimlerin birincil kaygıları “rejim güvenliği”dir. Bu tehlike altında olduğu durumlarda diğer bütün konular önemini kaybetmektedir. İran açısından da halk hareketlerinin her ne koşulda olursa olsun bastırılması gerekmektedir. Hatta ABD Dışişleri Bakanlığı “İran’ın Suriye’deki gösterileri bastırma konusunda Suriye güvenlik güçlerine yardım ettiğine dair güvenilir istihbaratları olduğu” şeklinde açıklama yapmıştır. Suriye rejimi doğası gereği mevcut şartlarda reform telkinlerini dikkate almayarak halk hareketlerini bastırmaya odaklanmıştır. Bu da Türkiye-Suriye ilişkilerinin sorgulanmasını beraberinde getirmektedir. Burada Türkiye ve Suriye’nin karşılıklı olarak hayal kırıklığına uğradığı söylenebilir. Koşulsuz destek beklentisi içindeki Suriye muhtemelen Başbakan Erdoğan’ın “bölgede yeni Hama’lar, Humus’lar istemiyoruz” ifadelerini kaygıyla takip etmiştir. Aynı şekilde Türkiye, Beşar Esad’ın İran ile birlikte hareket ederek Türkiye’nin telkinlerini dikkate almıyor olmasından rahatsızlık duymaktadır.

Türkiye kendi kredisini kullanarak Batı’ya karşı desteklediği Beşar Esad yönetiminden son olaylarda beklediği karşılığı bulamamıştır. Bu durum Türkiye’yi Batı karşısında zor durumda bırakırken bundan sonraki süreçte Suriye ile ilişkilerinin de eskisi gibi sürmesine engel olacaktır. Suriye ile aynı karede gözükmenin maliyeti daha da artacaktır. Suriye açısından ise her ne kadar bir hayal kırıklığı olsa da orta vadede Türkiye’ye yeniden ihtiyaç duyulacaktır. Zira Suriye’nin şu an koşulsuz güvendiği İran, olayların sona ermesi neticesinde yaşayacağı uluslararası izolasyondan kurtulması noktasında rol oynayamayacaktır. Bu noktada 2003 ve 2005 yıllarındaki gibi Türkiye’nin yardım elini uzatması ise son derece zor gözükmektedir. Bütün bu olasılıklar Suriye’de halk hareketlerinin bastırılarak rejimin devamı durumunda geçerli olacaktır.

Türkiye’nin geçen on yılda ve son olaylarda göz ardı ettiği konu “Suriye rejimi reform yapabilir mi?” sorusuna yanıt vermek olmuştur. Suriye rejiminin doğasını anlama, Beşar Esad’ın rejim içindeki konumu analiz etme noktasında hatalar yapılmış olabilir. Rejim içinde değişim isteyen grubun değişime karşı çıkan kesimler karşısında yeteri kadar güce sahip olmadığı görülmüştür. Suriye’nin halk hareketlerini bastırış şekli “reformcu Beşar Esad’a karşı rejim içindeki sertlik yanlısı güçlü isimler” algısını da zayıflatmıştır. Rejim güvenliği söz konusu olduğunda tüm grupların çok da fazla birbirinden kopuk olmadığı görülmüştür. Daha çok İran’a yakın olan Mahir Esad, Rami Maluf gibi sertlik yanlısı isimler reform baskılarını dikkate almaktan ziyade İran’dan gelen siyasi, askeri desteğe dayanmaktadır. Türkiye her ne kadar Suriye ile son 10 yılda yakınlaşmış olsa da İran’ın Suriye ile müttefiklik ilişkisi 1980’li yılların başına dayanmaktadır. Güvenlik alanında yakın işbirliği sürmektedir. Arap Alevi kökenli Suriyeli elitler ve Şii İran arasındaki ideolojik yakınlığı da bu faktörlere eklemek gerekmektedir.

Suriye bağlamında Türkiye’yi sıkıntıya sokan bir diğer boyut genel Ortadoğu politikasının sorgulanmasıdır. Türkiye son yıllarda Ortadoğu politikasının merkezine “meşruiyeti” ve “mazlum halkların yanında olma” ilkelerini yerleştirmiştir. Bu doğrultuda İsrail’in Gazze’de sivil halka saldırıları sert şekilde eleştirilmiş, Mısır’daki isyan sırasında “halkın taleplerinin dikkate alınması” yönünde bir söylem kullanılmıştır. Türkiye’nin bölgede son yıllarda Ortadoğu’da artan etkinliğinin önemli ayaklarından birini halklar nezdinde kazandığı popülarite oluşturmaktadır. Suriye’deki protestocu grupların da Türkiye’den destek beklentisi içinde olduğu görülmektedir. Ancak, Suriye ile yakın ilişkilerin olması, olası değişimin Türkiye’yi olumsuz etkileme potansiyeli gibi nedenlerle Türkiye, Esad yönetimini eleştirme konusunda çekingen davranmaktadır. Bu da Türkiye’nin statükodan ziyade değişimden, rejimlere karşı halktan yana tavır alan duruşu ile çelişki yaratarak dış politikada meşruiyet sorunu yaratmaktadır. Uzun yıllardır Türkiye bayrakları sallayan bölge halkı Libya’da ilk kez Türkiye Başkonsolosluğu’na saldırmıştır. Aynı tehlike şu an Türkiye’ye güvendiklerini söyleyen Suriyeli muhalif halk açısından da geçerlidir.

Filistin’de İkili Yapı Sona mı Eriyor?: El Fetih – HAMAS Anlaşması

Filistin’de 2006 yılında gerçekleşen parlamento seçimlerinde HAMAS’ın kazandığı zafer sonrasında El Fetih ve HAMAS arasında yaşanan gerilim HAMAS’a uygulanan ambargo ile artmıştı. Buna paralel olarak HAMAS, seçimden bir yıl sonra gerçekleştirdiği bir darbe ile Gazze Şeridi’nde kontrolü ele geçirmişti. Böylece Filistin yönetimi içinde, HAMAS kontrolündeki Gazze ve El Fetih kontrolündeki Batı Şeria olmak üzere ikili bir yapı ortaya çıkmıştı. İlerleyen yıllarda, iki partinin koalisyon hükümeti ile bölgeyi yönetme girişimleri de başarısızlıkla sonuçlanmış ve Gazze Şeridi ile Batı Şeria yönetimleri 2007 yılında birbirinden fiilen kopmuştu.

Geçen hafta içinde HAMAS ve El Fetih yıllardır süren ayrılığa son vererek tarihi bir anlaşmaya imza attılar. Mısır’ın arabuluculuğunda gizli yürütülen görüşmeler neticesinde ikili yönetime son verme noktasında önemli bir adım atılmış, 2006 yılından bu yana birbirleriyle mücadele eden Filistinli iki grup birleşmiştir. Varılan uzlaşı çerçevesinde bağımsızlardan oluşacak geçici birlik hükümeti kurulması, bir yıl içinde seçimlerin gerçekleştirilmesi, ortak güvenlik komitesi oluşturulması konularında mutabakata varılmıştır.

Anlaşma, Filistin Yönetimi’nin 1967 sınırları dahilinde bağımsız Filistin Devleti’nin Birleşmiş Milletler tarafından tanınması yönündeki çabalarını sürdürmesi süreci ile doğrudan ilgilidir. Bu yılın Eylül ayında gerçekleşmesi beklenen tanınma, İsrail Başbakanı BenyaminNetanyahu’nun “doğru şartlar oluşması halinde, İsrail'in eylül ayından önce Filistin devletini tanıyabileceğini” söylemesi ile farklı bir boyuta taşınmıştı. Filistin Yönetimi içindeki ikili yapının sona ermesi ve HAMAS-El Fetih uzlaşısı bağımsızlığın tanınması açısından önkoşullardan biri olarak görülmekteydi. Dolayısıyla anlaşma her şeyden önce devletleşme süreci ile doğrudan bağlantılıdır.

İsrail-Filistin meselesi ve Ortadoğu’da yaşanan bazı gelişmeler anlaşmaya varılması konusunda doğrudan etkili olmuştur. Bu etki hem El Fetih hem de HAMAS açısından geçerlidir. El Fetih açısından bakıldığında son aylarda yaşanan iki gelişme etkili olmuştur. İsrail ile yürütülen görüşmelerin sonuçsuz kalması ve ABD’nin BM Güvenlik Konseyi’nde İsrail’in Batı Şeria’da yeni Yahudi yerleşimi inşasına karşı alınan karara veto uygulaması El Fetih’i HAMAS ile barış yapma konusunda motive etmiştir. HAMAS açısından bakıldığında ise Ortadoğu’da son aylarda yaşanan muhalif halk hareketleri etkili olmuştur. HAMAS örgütünün siyasi lideri Halit Meşal ve örgütün polit bürosu Şam’da faaliyet göstermektedir. Bölge genelinde yaşanan muhalif halk hareketleri de son olarak Suriye’ye sıçramıştır. Esad rejiminin yıkılması olasılığıHAMAS’ın bu ülkedeki faaliyetlerini riske sokmaktadır. Hem İsrail sınırlarında güvenli bir bölgeyi kaybetme hem de siyasi, askeri ve finansal destekten mahrum kalma riski ile karşıyadır. Bu nedenle son gelişmelerin HAMAS’ı El Fetih ile uzlaşmaya zorladığını söylemek mümkündür. Muhalif hareketlerin bir diğer etkisi kamuoyu beklentileri ve halkın taleplerinin yönetimler tarafından daha fazla dikkate alınmasını sağlaması ve meşruiyetin önemli bir kavram olarak ortaya çıkması olmuştur. Filistin yönetimleri arasındaki bölünmeden rahatsız olan Filistinliler İsrail’e karşı mücadelede Filistin tarafını zayıflatan ikili yapının sona ermesi yönünde bir beklenti içindeydi. El Fetih yöneticilerinden Azzam Ahmet “ayrılığın sona ermesini isteyen Filistinlilerin arzuları yerine geldi” diyerek halkın taleplerine olan duyarlılığı göstermiştir. Ayrıca son haftalarda Gazze ve Batı Şeria’da rüşvet ve yolsuzluğa karşı yönetim karşıtı gösteriler de düzenleniyordu. Bu da iki örgütü anlaşmaya iten bir faktör olmuştur. Uzlaşı görüşmelerinde HAMAS ekibine liderlik eden Musa Ebu Marzuk’un “Arap Dünyası’nın yeni gerçekleri bu anlaşmayı mümkün kılmıştır” sözleri de bu doğrultudadır.

HAMAS-El Fetih uzlaşısı sıkıntılı bir süreçten geçen Mısır’ın bölgesel rolüne olumlu katkı yapmıştır. Mısır, Mübarek yönetimi zamanında da arabuluculuk yürütüyordu ancak içerde Müslüman Kardeşler hareketi ile sorunlu ilişkisi nedeniyle HAMAS’a güvenmemekteydi. Aynı şekilde HAMAS yönetimi de Mısır’ı tarafsız bir arabulucu olarak görmüyordu. Yeni Mısır yönetiminin farklı kimlik tanımlaması nedeniyle arabuluculuk konusu ve HAMAS’la ilişkilere farklı yaklaştığı söylenebilir. Mısır, HAMAS açısından daha güvenilir bir aktör konumuna gelmiş ve Mısır’ın örgüt üzerindeki etkisi artmıştır. Bu durum uzun vadede HAMAS’ın İran ve Mısır ile olan ilişkilerinde Mısır lehine ve İran aleyhine bazı değişimler yaratabilir.Anlaşma İsrail tarafında ise tepkiye karşılanmıştır. Başbakan Netanyahu, “Filistin Yönetimi ya İsrail ile ya da HAMAS ile barış yapmak zorundadır. İkisi ile birlikte barış imkansızdır” şeklindeki ifadeleri ile ülkesinin tepkisini ortaya koymuştur. Dolayısıyla uzlaşı Filistin Yönetimi’nin İsrail ve dolayısıyla da ABD ile ilişkilerini germe riski taşımaktadır.